National identity as a phenomenon
– logical table and examples –

Andor Müller

Content

Preface

In this study, I will first (Chapter 1) discuss the genetic-historical narrative of national consciousness, its (Chapter 1.1) European aspect, in the context of the printing of books, industrialization, economic transformation, civilization, and the French Revolution, which, together with the Enlightenment, replaced the first two orders of the feudal system, namely the institution of kingship and the clergy that supported it. But (Chapter 1.2), following secularisation, the abandonment of sacral transcendence gave way to insufficient religious substitutes, leaving the need for 'home' unfulfilled, which was essential for man. Citizenship brought law and democracy but broke down the millennial alliance with God. National liberalism and other communitarian ideas thus created an ideal place for the aspirations of radical liberalism, which has been completely transformed by the modern age, and which sees ancient respect for authority in the bourgeoisie and therefore also sees the national-liberal bourgeois order, which is fundamental to its tradition, as something that should be replaced.

The national consciousness of the Hungarians is quite different from this (Chapter 1.3), since they came from Asia and have no related European folks in a strong sense (except for their ally, who also wanted freedom), and therefore have a greater cohesive force, but due to their geographical location they have been subjected to countless wars, and therefore their population has been constantly changing ethnologically, and after great population losses, they were happy to let in settlers of other nationalities. This mixed-blood nation, however, is sympathetic and welcoming because of its particular culture, but suspicious of invaders. The latter became even more pronounced after the Trianon peace treaty. After the Second World War, the Soviet puppet government and its successors tried to tear out the hearts of being Hungarian, forcing atheism and internationalism instead of national consciousness, and knocked down the 1956 war of independence. Despite this, its unique culture and endowments make Hungary an interesting and valuable tourist destination. I will then clarify in my study (in Chapter 1.4) that the national consciousness of the 21st century is not conservatism in the bad sense, nationalism which is far from Nazism.

I will present (in Chapter 2) Kees Teszelszky's division of the academic theories of national identity consciousness, breaking down the different schools of thought, and try to present a comprehensive overview of the divergent basic ideas.

Order and security are some of the prominent features of national identity (Chapter 3), defended by many, but attacked by others precisely because they see the shadows of the past in it, rather than dreams of world peace. In order to reconcile such different opinions, we must be aware of their emotional power and strive to approach reason, for it is rarely a good idea to deviate from the path of realpolitik.

I will discuss (in Chapter 4) a psychological approach according to which there are splits in the national consciousness (cognitive vs. emotional, past vs. future, 'us' vs. 'others') which, when superimposed, lead to narcissism. But in my view, the psychology of Nazism should not be universally projected on all nations, and in the past not only dark shadows but also a glorious past can be discovered, which gives strength to build from.
I will go into more detail (in Chapter 5) on the contemporary German situation, which has deep historical roots, self-blaming and remorse for past atrocities, which has now been reduced to self-abandonment. I will analyse the meaning of national identity, what kind of status this concept has, and how this intellectual entity holds so much together. I will also talk about the

inescapability of emotions and the possibility of re-funding a national identity and consciousness, which is not in any way the same as copying some past form.

After this, I would like to point out again that (in Chapter 6) integration has always been an important part of the Hungarian identity, because the country, harassed by wars, suffered huge blood losses, and therefore always welcomed settlers, and it was not the Hungarians who held slaves, but the Hungarians who were considered slaves by several conquering nations, and our freedom fights were often crushed in blood.

I will briefly discuss (in Chapter 7) the motivational aspects and antipodes of European national identity, in the topics of 1) national identity in the good sense, 2) national identity in the bad sense, 3) real national consciousness, 4) opponents of national identity, and 5) problematic national identity.

I will then turn (Chapter 8) to the aspect of natural science, to Tamás Freund's theory of the emotional regulation of the neural network - by 'superpolyps' - which is closely related to the topic of creativity. According to István Tózsa's confirmation, emotions, together with creativity, influence the quality of national identity. This means that national identities - i.e. because of their geography and other diverse cultural experiences with positive emotional content - have creative potential as an emotional aspect of duration (Freund and Tózsa). Only as an addition is Kant's genius aesthetics of the variability of rules mentioned at the end.

After that, I will turn (Chapter 9) to the preparation of the philosophical grounding of national identity, its emergence (Chapter 9.1) as a new phenomenon that does not start from given determinations. This requires (Chapter 9.2) a brief discussion of the division of consciousness (sense-perception-emotion: hence the name originally given to the philosophy of the 3Es), (Chapter 9.3) an introduction to Kant's ideas of reason (Self, World, God), and an interpretation of Czétány and a critical application of their philosophy. (Chapter 9.4) Czétány's examples illustrate well the unidimensional interpretation of conservatism, which is closest to national identity, i.e. the unidimensional interpretation of the old-new approach to national identity.

A culminating point of the study (Chapter 10) is the use of philosophical grounding of national identity, i.e. (Chapter 10.1) the diagram of the architectonics of the philosophical 'background', (Chapter 10.2) the logic table, and (Chapter 10.3) the logic table populated with examples. Finally, there is (Chapter 11) the conclusion.

Introduction

Ideologies by their nature tend to displace each other through their representatives, although a balance is needed to prevent the emergence of dictatorships. The problem is not that this or that ideology exists, but that one is too loud. In Europe today, radical liberalism seems to be slowly cutting out its rivals, especially nationalist thinking. The representatives of radical liberalism pretend that right-wing thinking is diabolical, when every ideology has its own beauty and its own dark side. Since balance requires pluriconsistency[1] between ideologies, now we have to

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[1] This is György Czétány's philosopycal technical term, it's conceptual definition, see Czétány 2019, p. 287. „the three [The Kantian concept of mind as] synthesisesare synthesises including the whole of reality. God, Me and the World: all three emerge with the demand of wholeness, the demand of reality, as the whole synthesis. This is the transcendental problem of 'pluriconsistent' reality."

see what nationalism is, when and how it was created, why it has been pushed into the background, and how its contemporary manifestation, the national identity and consciousness of the 21st century, can be re-established, rather than copied from some past form. This, however, requires a thoughtful philosophical basis. This is my current goal.

The definition of national identity is often referred to in narrow terms and with negative connotations,[2] whereas a scholarly approach with philosophical depth and ambition makes it clear that time has passed beyond the unidimensional perspective[3] and that this phenomenon has considerably more character in the 21st century than it has been tried to squeeze in in the past.[4] Indeed, national consciousness is not synonymous with the exclusion of 'others'. Of course, the question will arise as to what the reason is for this prejudice, beyond the possible empirical aspects - what can be verified and disproved (falsified), counter-argued - when and by what line of thought has philosophical thought become so judgmental of national consciousness, and what contradictions it carries within its own structure, and how can we help to correct this?

If I interpret the notion of national identity as a weakened intuitionism, i.e., I validate ad hoc approaches - ignoring the well-intentioned philosophical (Spinoza) meaning of intuition as a definition - I am only falling into a prettified elitism, political and historical discourse, but if, at the other end of the dichotomy, I offer only a formal-logical analysis (as the philosophers of the Vienna Circle did with language), I end up with extreme structures of thought. Somewhere in between is the truth, according to the Aristotelian principle of the golden mean. I look for logic in the explanation of the concept, which I "fill in" with real world experience. This is what I try to "create", or rather "map" in the following.

As an introduction, I would like to quote what two anthropologists (Albert and Zempléni 2002, p. 169) consider to be 'very remarkable' in the phenomenon of national identity.

> [...] In what we see as a very remarkable feature of national identity [... :] beyond the image of chosen opponents, national society 'sprouts' a distinctive character or ethos called Hungarian, French or German, which can extend to all aspects of social and individual life, from dressing to the way of thinking, from the flag to music, from eating to the expression of emotions. When national ideology applies the same adjective to such heterogeneous things, concepts and phenomena as the Hungarian moustache, weeping consolation, cosmopolitan inventiveness, goulash, love of freedom and the Csárdás, 'national science', the ideology of misfortune or the 'Hungarian character', it is obviously stereotyping in a

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[2] The concepts of nationalism, national identity and nation have been interpreted in many different ways, even in scholarly writings. On the one hand, because they are abstract, academic terms, and on the other hand, because each of them carries a current political charge, since politics has appropriated them for current purposes with positive and negative connotations. The meanings of these terms in today's media and political language are mostly negative, often linked to extremist views or political violence. Even in the study of nationalism and nationalist thought, we often encounter confusion of concepts. The intertwining of politics and science has thus led to a confusion of concepts. For many years, there has been a debate in academic circles about the correct definition of nationalism, without any agreement on the precise meaning of the political phenomenon." Teszelszky, Kees (2009). Source: Peter Alter, Nationalismus, Frankfurt a. M., 1985, 8-9.

[3] Which distinction usually claims that nationalists invoke the opposition between "us" and "others", the latter being degraded as alien. But this, as we shall see, is insufficient for the study of national identity.

[4] This will be demonstrated by means of a logic table, and instead of a one-sided conservative ideological approach, a balance will be promoted, which is partly liberal (demanding freedom) and partly left-wing (building a social net), although the latter derives from Christian solidarity rather than from revolutionary ideas, which only invoked it for their subversive activity but could not achieve it in a lasting way.

strong way. But the fact that the national society can and does bring so many different things under a common adjective is quite remarkable.5 It is precisely the philosophically demanding logic of this very remarkable phenomenon that we will elaborate by the end of this study.

In examining national identity, I follow several paths, from the methodologically simple to the methodologically increasingly complex. The structure and logic of this paper is as follows: first, I will deal with the historical background of national identity and the theoretical approaches and their division. Then I will mention some contemporary views, problems and issues related to national identity. In addition, I will include a natural scientific, or more specifically neurobiological, approach to national identity. I will then elaborate the philosophical foundations of my topic and fill in the resulting logical table. After the summary, I will conclude with a conclusion together with a short supplement.

I will specify dismantling the chapters. Briefly, I will discuss: I) the historical forming, II) the theoretical division of national identity, III) opposing views on national identity today, and IV) a psychological approach. In between, I will mention V) the current assessment of the situation in Germany, the importance of emotions and the possibility of re-founding the national identity, VI) I will draw attention to the integration factors and fears in the history of Hungary, VII) the motivations and counter-motivations for national identity, and VIII) the relationship between national identity, brain research and creativity. Only after these will I turn to a more philosophical discussion. In IX), I will first discuss the methodology of the approach, then I will clarify the registers of consciousness (sense-perception-emotion), the Kantian transcendental ideas of reason (Self, World, God), and then X) as philosophical architectonics I use the ideas of reason as terrains and divide them according to the aspects of sense-perception-feeling, and fill the resulting table with the corresponding essentialities of national identity. Finally, I summarize all this briefly in XI) and add details to it in XII) and conclude.

1. The genetic-historical narrative of national consciousness

1.1. The forming of national consciousness in Europe

What is national consciousness? First of all, it must be noted that national consciousness is different in space and time, i.e. it is different in Europe, Asia, America and in general on different continents, and in different historical periods, such as the last centuries or the present days. As a result, national consciousness is clearly different in a feudal context, in a bourgeois context and in a liberal and precise society. It all depends on the identity of the 'elite', their interests, their alliance networks and their competitors.

In Hegel's lectures on world history[6], we can read about the ancient Chinese empire, in which the World Spirit appeared in its primitive state, because only the emperor was free, the master of life and death. Submission to and reverential fear of the power of the secular and sacral ruler

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[5] Albert Réka és Zempléni András (2002): *A nemzeti identitás sajátosságairól.* 169f In: Fedinec Csilla (ed.) 2002.: Társadalmi önismeret és nemzeti önazonosság Közép-Európában. Teleki László Alapítvány, Budapest. pp 167-176.

[6] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1979, *Előadások a világtörténet filozófiájáról.* (trans. Szemere Samu) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.

overall was utterly far from the time when the World Spirit, moving from East to West, would make its way to the establishment of a civil law system and religious freedom.

In the feudal environment of the Western European kingdoms, this relationship between king and subjects was also typical. In addition to secular rule, the king - as a symbolic unifier supported by the clergy which was by the Pope - established a system of relations with a separate sphere of interest that transcended national boundaries. Community consciousness was then reinforced by religious ceremonies, symbolic festivals, songs, myths and poems spread by word of mouth.

The rise of the Cartesian Enlightenment as a rational critique, however, put a crack in the shield of tradition. Cultural and social transformations (the spread of printing, the Reformation, the beginnings of industrialisation in the guilds - the industrial revolution, the development of trade, capitalism, bourgeoisisation) paved the way for change. It became possible to criticise or even mock religiousness - under a fake name - and news/fake news of abuses were no longer just sung but spread, and citizens became increasingly interested in 'earthly' needs (like the Third Order in France, with the addition of the peasantry). All of this eventually led to the emergence of national sentiment as a symbol in its own right, alongside a weakened authority of sovereign rulers and clergy, which was increasingly elaborated by political thinkers and philosophers. Theorists imagined a new world order, with civil religion, legal equality and freedom, that is, a social contract. Rousseau argued that national consciousness must be protected. He believed that a successful nation should not be vulnerable to others - as he illustrated by closing borders - but what he considered most important was an internal cohesiveness that was written in the 'heart' of the people. Mária Ludassy wrote of the former:

> Rousseau, in his preface to [...] Narcissus, contrasts the sanctity of simple peasant customs with the destructive influence of philosophical scepticism, and in one of his replies he announces a programme of complete cultural isolation, which he preserves in his late draft constitution: the best way to preserve the national identity of a country is to erect a gallows at its borders, on which must be hung anyone who wishes to import from outside a morality different from that which is enshrined in the traditions of the country in question, or anyone who wishes to leave his country in order to abandon the way of life based on the faith of his ancestors in the belief in the uniqueness of his ancestors by learning foreign customs.[7]

And in his *On the Social Contract* (1762), Rousseau wrote the following about the laws written in the heart:

> 'To these [...] laws there is another [...], and this is the most certain of all. It is not engraved in marble or ore, but in the hearts of the citizens, as the true constitution of the State, which is renewed every day, and when other laws grow old or die out, breathes new life into them or takes their place, keeps alive the spirit of its foundation in the people, and replaces the force of power by the force of habit without being noticed. I am talking about morals, customs and, above all, public opinion. Our statesmen know nothing of these things, and on them depends the strength of our laws. But the great legislator secretly takes care of these when he seems to confine himself to issuing special laws, because the latter are only the arch of the edifice, the unshakeable cornerstone consists of the morals which are more slowly formed.[8]

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[7] Rousseau 1762/1997, p. 3; Rousseau, J. J. (1762/1997): *A társadalmi szerződésről, avagy A politikai jog elvei.* (trans. Kis János, ed., notes Ludassy Mária), PannonKlett, Budapest, (Matúra bölcselet)
[8] Same, p. 42

According to Ludassy, Rousseau's point is this: 'the moi commun, the collective created by the social contract, can know no other freedom than the moral (and political) commandment of identification with the community.' (Ludassy 1999, p. 138.) This is what according to him Burke criticises but Robespierre supports. Ludassy also mentions Robespierre's idealisation of Rousseau:

> "Of all those who, at the time of which I am speaking [up to this time he was speaking of the Encyclopedists, criticising their atheism and egoism - L.M.], in the field of literature and philosophy, only one man, by the elevation of his spirit and the greatness of his character, has shown himself worthy to be the teacher of the human race. He openly attacked tyranny; he spoke enthusiastically of divinity; he painted a bright picture of the attractions of virtue with manly and irreproachable eloquence, and defended the consoling creeds which reason gives to the human heart. The purity of his doctrines, which he drew from nature and from his profound contempt of sin, and his immense contempt for the intriguing sophists who usurped the name of philosopher, brought upon him the hatred and persecution of his rivals and lying friends. O that he could witness the revolution which he prepared, and which gave him his resting-place in the Pantheon, his noble soul would doubtless embrace the cause of justice and equality with a happy zeal! " (On religious and moral ideals, their relation to republican principles and national festivals, 7 May 1794 - Year II Floréal 18).[9]

Thus at last, in 1789, the hungry and enraged French people could pin national sentiment 'on their banner' and above all on their hearts (they had nothing left to lose and were fed up with both the secular ruler who abused his power and the religious leaders who supported him). The Restoration failed to dismantle this, and the militant emperor rather reinforced it, and after his downfall he left as heritage a bourgeoisising legal order, the Code Napoleon.

The French concept was that of a nation-state (a unity of people living in a single territory), while the German one was that of a nation of cultures (a nation of people speaking a single language). This is no coincidence, since Ernest Renan said that even then, in the 19th century, it was true that there were not 12 Frenchmen in France who could trace their ancestry back to their Frankish ancestors[10] (since they were made up of many groups, such as the Bretons, Normans, Gascon, Aquitanians, Pravoslavs, etc.), while the Germans, despite the movement of borders, lived in a block and referred to their Germanic ancestors.[11] The French therefore referred to language, while the Germans referred to blood, but as a counter-test, we can say that neither blood nor language alone is sufficient to define national identity.

1.2. Secularisation and the need for homeliness, the inadequacy of religious supplements

Secular leaders have always been replaceable, but the marginalisation of sacrality in the centuries following the French Enlightenment and Revolution the relationship with the transcendent that makes one's life at home in the world, that defines one's place and purpose, slowly eroded. This cannot be examined from a purely material-economic point of view, since the latter is only a possible research methodology for the loss of the feeling of One (Scheler's

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[9] Ludassy Mária (1999.): *Elhiszem, mert ésszerű. Tanulmányok az angol és a francia felvilágosodás koráról.* Osiris, Budapest. p. 139.

[10] Renan Ernst: *Mi a nemzet?* Holmi, 6. grade (1994) i. 8 1177-1188. Quoted: Zelnik József, in: Kásler Miklós ed. (2014): *Nemzeti Nagyvizit.* Kairosz, Budapest. p. 49.

[11] Kásler Miklós ed. (2014): *Nemzeti Nagyvizit.* Kairosz, Budapest. p. 52.

term is *Einsfühlung*[12], while Freud quotes an acquaintance of his as saying "ocean-feeling"[13]), but not a sufficient condition for regaining the feeling of One with the transcendent. We see, we experience, that even today there is a massive demand for a religious surrogate. In vain is the branch of liberalism that proclaims the slogan "Realize yourself!" as a substitute. The domination of the rational, calculating ego led to social alienation and abandonment after the Enlightenment, which again made the research of intersubjective social relations important, but this proved to be insufficient, so the focus was shifted to the transcendent in order to get rid of the lost homeliness (Buber: *Eclipse of God*[14]; according to Janicaud's critics*, the theological shift of the French phenomenology*[15] occurred*). The national consciousness of the 21st century has to account for it as well, which I will later discuss.

1.3. National consciousness in the history of Hungary and the potential for economic benefit in the present

Hungarian national identity has developed in a slightly different way from Western Europe, its approach is not modernist and constructivist, but historical, because we came here as a united people and, despite our intermingling, we have always fought our freedom struggles for the sake of a common "Hungarianness". The Hungarians migrated to Europe from the East, leaving their ancestral homeland and religion (this is why our shamans pronounced the Turanian curse[16], which refers to the fragmentation and division of the people's soul and thus of the people itself). It has fought many bitter heroic battles - defending itself and defending the whole of Europe - its population has been severely thinned, it has mixed with conquerors and colonisers, and although it occupied the Carpathian Basin for 1000 years, this multi-ethnic country was still dismembered in 1920 by the Trianon peace treaty. We cannot therefore refer to bloodlines, and the language and public education reforms can only be traced back centuries,[17] but something still binds the Hungarian nationality inhabitants of the present

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[12] Scheler, Max (1973): *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie.* (original 1912, supplemented 1922, 1926), Bern, A. Francke AG Verlag

[13] Freud, Sigmund (1992): *Rossz közérzet a kultúrában*; trans. Linczényi Adorján; Kossuth, Bp.

[14] Buber, Martin (1952/2017): the eclipse of God. (translated by Csaba László Gáspár) Typotex, Budapest, 2017.

[15] Janicaud, Dominique (1991): Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française. Combas: Éd. de l'éclat.

[16] Tózsa 2020, p. 15, footnote: The Turanian Plain is a vast area between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea, on the eastern edge of Eastern Europe. It was once the ancestral homeland of Hungary, the Great Hungary (Magna Hungaria), and in the present-day Russian Federation it also includes the territory of the Bashkir and Tatar Republics. The majority of the Hungarian tribes migrated from there towards the Black and Azov Seas, to the swampy Meotis, then to the central region of present-day Ukraine, the South-Eastern Mediterranean, and from there to the Carpathian Basin, where they adopted the "new faith", Christianity. For this, the priests of the ancient Hungarian religion, the Turanian táltos, cursed them: a people who abandon their ancestral land, abandon their gods - so they say - and for this, eternal fratricidal warfare and discord is their just reward. This is the essence of the "Turanian curse" that afflicts the Hungarians.

[17] Language alone is not enough to maintain community, as Gábor Barna writes: "[...] language - contrary to the stereotype of 'the nation lives in its language' that is fixed in us - can play a changing role in shaping national identity. Already István Györffy noticed that the Hungarian language alone is not enough of a holding force. This is proved by the rapid assimilation of the middle class in the post-Trianon successor states. [ANDRÁSFALVY 1991. 166. Bálint Sándor says the same: „A nation doesn't only live in its language, but in its traditions, too." (BÁLINT 1934. 9.)] Or we can refer to the Scots, the Irish, the Hungarians in America, the Germans in Hungary, who have lost their language. [ERB-KNOPF 2001] Other determinants can take on a dominant role in the construction of identity. Often religion. It is enough to mention here the self-definition of the Moldavian Csángó-Hungarians: they define themselves as Roman Catholics. However, in order to preserve identity, as well as to maintain and transmit national culture, institutions are needed: 'the church and the school', but also family, folklore group, party, radio, television, newspaper and others. If these are missing or lost, identity preservation is more difficult or simply

motherland and the detached parts together, and that is the "spiritual sense of belonging"[18], a spiritual bond,[19] as Attila József and Renan said: "the nation is a common inspiration".[20]

The fate of the Hungarian nation is rooted differently than that of other European countries. Its ancient history is difficult to trace in the lack of written heritage. The Hungarians are regarded as conquerors from far away in Europe. They lived in a tribal alliance under a reigning prince, then needed religious - Christian - integration to make peace with the surrounding peoples, and in recognition of this, a kingdom was established. The foundation of the state was born out of this type of necessity, and the Hungarians still live in solitude in Europe without their sister nations. This is how it has always been treated. The self-consciousness of this nation was influenced by the new religion, because its old religion had been superficially replaced at the level of symbols, but in its heart the old warrior habitus and the new faith of love were mixed. For centuries, the Hungarians in Europe had been nourished by the memories of their heroic cult and the hopes of their new religion, and found their identity in these. The Holy Crown became an important new symbol of the nation, and after the tragedy of the Tatar invasion, it remains a symbol of national survival and inherence to this day.

The first sign of national identity was the blood covenant in the times of conquest, followed by the Holy Crown, but perhaps its most articulate manifestation was in the 1848-49 War of Independence against the foreign Habsburg monarchy, which was victorious, but subsequently the Austrians asked for help and the freedom fighters laid down their weapons before the Russians. The Austrians then launched a bloody reprisal. Sándor Petőfi's "National Song", which he himself recited at the beginning of the national liberal war for independence in March 1848, is an accurate articulation of national identity. Petőfi was not "only" the greatest Hungarian poet, he also took up the sword.

„On your feet now, Hungary calls you!
Now is the moment, nothing stalls you,
Shall we be slaves or men set free
That is the question, answer me!
[…]
Leap to my side, ancestral sword.
[…]
Magyars, once more our name and story
Shall match our ancestors' in glory
The centuries of shame and hurt
Can now be washed away like dirt.
[…]
And wheresoever we may perish
Grandchildren those graves shall cherish

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impossible." Gábor Barna (2006). In József Jankovics - Judit Nyerges (eds.): Culture and Identity. Debrecen, 22-26 August 2006. International Society for Hungarian Studies, Budapest. 2011, 61-85. https://mek.oszk.hu/09300/09396/html/01.htm (Downloaded: 2021-12-11).

[18] This is Miklós Kásler's wording In: Miklós Kásler ed. (2014). Kairosz, Budapest. p. 52.

[19] I have slightly renamed it, and Anna Jókai mentions it more precisely, borrowing it from Béla Hamvas: "[...] there is the spirit of the place, the genius loci, the Hungarian spirituality, which holds us together." In Béla Hamvas. European Protestant Hungarian Free University, Bern, 1985 In Kásler Miklós ed. (2014). Kairosz, Budapest. p. 50.

[20] András Lengyel: "Inspiration and Nation", on Attila József's concept of the nation. Új Forrás, Vol. 35 (2003) No. 5 (http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00016/00085/030518.htm Downloaded: 11-12-2021) Cited by Jószef Zelnik, in. Kairosz, Budapest. p. 50.

Singing our praises in their prayers
To thank us that our names are theirs.
By all the gods of Hungary
We hereby swear,
That we the yoke of slavery
No more shall wear."[21]

The inherence and heroic cult could only be broken down after the second world war by the Russian invaders, and although there was a desperate national burst of independence in 1956, but it still shows in the way of thought of many Hungarian citizens and its antinational sallies (for example campaigning against the 5 December 2004 referendum on dual citizenship for Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary and the then ruling Liberals and leftists in government). Through half a millennium they forced the Hungarians to defy itself, to be internationalist instead of its national consciousness, to be atheist instead of being religious. A sociological survey conducted at the turn of the millennium on the comparison of Hungarian national identity and religiousness may serve as an interesting contribution.

> Among the Hungarian sociological studies of religion and values that have investigated the relationship between religion and national identity, Ferenc Gereben's study stands out.[22] The researcher starts from the assumption that the historical relationship between religion and national identity (national culture) has been strongly emphasised in all countries of the Central and Eastern European region. In this region, the historical challenge facing the given community as a national task has been sacralised in the spirit of Christianity. One of the most important findings of the research is that the identity types that emotionally and actively embraced national belonging were very strongly attracted to religious faith on the one hand, and to additional values such as 'tolerance' and 'thirst for knowledge' on the other. Indifferent, incomplete, negative identities, on the other hand, showed a strong correlation with "self-actualisation" rather than religion. The other important conclusion is that rejection of religion is very likely to be associated with rejection or indifference to national identity; a more active, deeper and richer religiousness than usual (in faith, religious experience, religious practice) is associated with deeper, more positive and active forms of national identity. The researcher explains all this by their common embeddedness in a traditional set of values. At the same time, religious people were not more optimistic than non-religious people about their prospects for the future, i.e. religiousness was not reflected in a more optimistic vision of the national future, but rather in greater tolerance. Likewise, it is thought-provoking that the strongest sense of national pride is felt among those belonging to the "explicitly religious" type, but the proportion of those who actively commit to their Hungarian identity is not highest in this group, but in the "neither not religious nor religious" category - the same applies to the perception of the importance of cultural tradition.[23]

The violent atheism of the Soviets thus did much to undermine religiousness and with it national self-consciousness. In the Eastern Block, communist indoctrination ruled, while in the West there was no obstacle to the pursuit of earthly pleasures. Both had moved away from Christian religiousness, but while the Eastern Block member states were economically bankrupt in denial

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[21] Petőfi Sándor: Nemzeti dal (trans. George Szirtes)

[22] Gereben Ferenc: Identitás, kultúra, kisebbség. Osiris, Budapest, 1999.; Gereben Ferenc – Tomka Miklós: *Vallásosság és nemzettudat*. Kerkai Intézet, Budapest, 2000.; Gereben Ferenc: *Vallás és nemzeti identitás. Történelmi visszapillantás*. Accessibility: www.rel.uszeged.hu/tomka/pdf/gereben.pdf. (Downloaded: 2020. április 16.)

[23] Kamarás István (2021.): *Vallásszociológiai keresztmetszetek*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.

of capitalist competition, the Westerners were going the Mandeville way[24], and the individuals' dind were economically serving the public good and prospering (though decadent in morals like the Easterners, they drank not in sorrow but in joy).

After WWII, the Western European countries were in the sphere of interest of the US, and the Eastern European countries were in the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Westerners 'saw' from afar the illusory attempt to implement Marxism-Leninism, while in Eastern Europe dictatorship and deportations raged, and inhuman torture not only broke the backbone of the Hungarian people, but also plunged the country into total economic bankruptcy, and after the regime change the political puppets who remained here converted their political power into economic power, selling out everything. The question is merely rhetorical: in the time since the 1989 regime change, in which direction would the labour force flow if the occupiers changed places? Hungary is currently trying to overcome more than half a century of economic disadvantage – reflected well in the differences in average wages between Eastern and Western Europe and our slow catching-up. It is worth mentioning a sociological survey on national identity in 2020 and some strong lines of fracture:

> In terms of social solidarity, two problematic points can be identified. One is that, to some extent, there are shifts in emphasis, partly along value lines, in terms of positive identification with the nation. In particular, there are differences between the two groups that focus on success in science, sport and culture and those that emphasise historical and political greatness - the former are more moderate, left-wing and humanistic in their values than the average, while the latter are typically right-wing, somewhat more radical and concerned with nationalism. Another potentially problematic point in terms of solidarity is that, apart from a simple lack of willingness to respond, the fact that 15.8% of the population (typically in the 18-29 age group and living in a town smaller than the county town) could not or did not want to mention any factor that could justify a sense of national pride may also indicate a certain degree of 'rootlessness' and disinterest. Our research also suggests a distinction between 'static' and 'acting' forms of identity. The picture that emerges from the study seems to be that the forces that shape Hungarian national pride, based on memories of the past, are lacking in the present, in terms of a lasting confidence in common political action. In the long term, this could even raise questions about the survival of the nation in the absence of a common interest.[25]

It is from here that the destroyed national identity must be rebuilt, telling the stories that were previously suppressed, because an entire generation and even their children were deliberately played off against their own traditions, subordinating the everyday practice of life and ideological education to other political interests.

In addition to the presentation of historical facts that were suppressed/repressed during the dictatorship (e.g. the film "Hungarian Passion" directed by and starring Károly Eperjes - 2021), positive nation-building results can be achieved through a multifaceted cultural education, adapted to the challenges of the times and using the opportunities wisely. In the short term, the benefits of cultural investment are primarily cultural, but in the longer term it strengthens social relations, national consciousness and thus social cohesion, which in turn brings concrete economic competitive advantages. For if citizens are more loyal to their own social system,

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[24] Madeville, Bernard (1705/2004.): *A méhek meséje, avagy magánvétkek – közhaszon.* (trans. Tótfalusi István) Helikon, Budapest.
[25] László-Makay 2021, p. 112.; László Tamás – Makay Mónika (2021.): *A nemzeti büszkeség építőkövei – Nemzeti identitás és történelemkép a magyar társadalomban.* Szociológiai Szemle 31(1): pp 87–115. https://doi.org/10.51624/SzocSzemle.2021.1.4

they are more loyal to each other and to their fellow citizens. However, everyone recognises that a community is always stronger than an atomised society. If everyone 'pulls', the galleon moves better, and can even become a soaring ship. Tax evasion and overbilling will become less common if citizens become more morally mature, since they can only promote their own interests if they are interested in win-win deals with their fellow citizens. This increases the GDP of the nation, and not only does it move from one pocket to another, but it also generates national added value. And a country strengthened in this way is attractive to all investors, i.e. its ability to attract capital is increased, as those interested in productivity can expect higher profits than other countries. Moreover, nations with stronger national cultures become more attractive to tourists because they are more interesting. What is interesting, what is attractive to tourists in today's world, generates revenue for the nation. In addition, the more culturally advanced nation can also benefit in terms of added value, for example in the area of food production by producing the most natural and healthy products, reviving the best traditions of the past, combining the triad of farming, livestock and processing with the development of appropriate marketing, complemented by first-class entertainment and accommodation. Sustainable farming and a healthy lifestyle have become more important than any other technical achievements. You have to eat, but bits and bytes don't feed you.

1.4. National consciousness is not conservatism in the bad sense, not nationalism

The national consciousness of the present cannot be confused with the feudalism of earlier historical periods, because that is a miscategorisation, a distortion. If one speaks of conservatism, one must distinguish whether one is doing so on the basis of a sociological class structure or whether one means the often disputed value representation of normality, since contemporary national consciousness in the bourgeois sense denies the former and prefers the latter. National consciousness is based on community of shared values, which is not dependent on class.

National consciousness is not nationalism in the bad sense, i.e. it does not differentiate according to ethnic distinctions, but it defines itself as a cultural community. In my view, the linguistic community and the historical community of destiny form the foundation of the cultural community. The knowledge of language is the most basic, on which further elite education can be based at the literary level, and the historical community of destiny stems from a sense of the importance of 'homeland' and 'home', which can be expressed in a wide variety of efforts, from art to self-sacrifice. Linguistic and historical solidarity is expressed symbolically in celebrations, in poems that reinforce the sense of national identity, and in the representatives of national consciousness. The willingness to serve the country is the strength of the nation.

I will now briefly quote what Pongrácz wrote about the value orientation of the nation and nationalism:

> The nation as an entity, however, appeared much earlier than the idea of nationalism itself, and we therefore believe that the nationalist "attitude" treated the nation as a simple reference point. Already focusing on the emotional component as well, Greenfeld has argued that nationalism is an umbrella term that contains national identity (nationhood), national consciousness and the collectivities based on these, the akin phenomena of nations,

and thus contains a set of ideas and emotions that conceptualise national identity.[26] Miroslav Hroch concentrated on the phenomenon of the attribution of values to the nation, arguing that the nationalist approach gives absolute priority to the values and interests of the nation - over all other values and interests.[27] Hence Anthony D. Smith could state about the worlview of nationalism that in the interpretation of a nationalist loyalty to the nation is the most relevant,[28] and Isaiah Berlin's further elaboration of this insight is that in the event of conflict with other values or interests, the national interest must prevail at all costs.[29] The "ethical state", according to Ignác Kuncz, is also based on "continuous self-sacrifice": the citizen must sacrifice himself for a "higher moral world order", since only a self-sacrificing being can be considered a "true being of the state".[30] The nation can thus also become "one vast solidarity", "the essential element of which is the sacrifices which our ancestors have made and those which we are prepared to make in the future", Ernest Renan argued.[31] [32]

National consciousness should not be confused with religious fanaticism. Although both are the result of the formation of consciousness and are mostly expressed in the emotions, national feeling is a community of benefits based on life-worldly motives, whereas religious fanaticism is not a life-worldly but an inherent force of value representation that shapes the life of communities, be it large or small. He who serves his nation serves his community, he who serves religious dogma serves God, regardless of people.

In the civil legal system, however, national consciousness is necessarily intertwined with religion, but in a form of religion that gives priority to the cultural community of the people of the nation, of which the "sublime" is an indispensable part, providing a sense of home and exaltation (see Kant's Critique 3: *Critique of Judgment*[33]). According to Kant in, to maintain the moral character of the community, we must assume the existence of God even if we cannot prove his existence by anything other than faith. The God who gives purpose to all things is expressed in intersubjectivity, that is, in all social relations, but the representatives of national consciousness among the nations of the world stand up first and foremost for their own community and then represent the Kantian cosmopolitanism. This is because it is rational to see that history, in ethnocultural terms, is a competition between peoples, a life-and-death struggle with short and long times of peace, and not everywhere the introduction of civil law is desired if it is considered alien - for example, by the Taliban in Afghanistan (it is similar experiences

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[26] Greenfeld 2004, p. 185.; Greenfeld, Liah (2004): *Nacionalizmus és modernitás*. In Kántor Zoltán ed.: Nacionalizmus-elméletek. (Szöveggyűjtemény). Budapest, Rejtjel Kiadó. pp 183–203.

[27] Hroch 2004, p. 232.; Hroch, Miroslav (2004): *A nemzeti mozgalomtól a nemzet teljes kifejlődéséig. A nemzetépítés folyamata Európában.* In Kántor Zoltán szerk.: Nacionalizmuselméletek. (Collection of texts). Budapest, Rejtjel Kiadó. pp 230–247.

[28] Smith 1995, p. 10.; Smith, Anthony D. (1995): *A nacionalizmus*. In Bretter Zoltán – Deák Ágnes ed.: Eszmék a politikában: a nacionalizmus. Pécs, Tanulmány Kiadó. pp 9–24.

[29] Berlin 1993, p. 230.; Berlin, Isaiah (1993): *A nacionalizmust valaha elhanyagolták, ma hatalmas úr*. In Ludassy Mária ed.: Az angolszász liberalizmus klasszikusa. II. kötet. Budapest, Atlantisz Könyvkiadó. pp 213–244.

[30] Kuncz 1902, p. 114.; Kuncz Ignác (1902): *A nemzetállam tankönyve.* Kolozsvár, Stein János Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Könyvkereskedése

[31] Quotes Smith 2000, 12.; Smith, Anthony D. (2000): *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism.* Cambridge, Polity Press.

[32] Pongrácz Alex (2018): *A nacionalizmus és a nacionalista államfelfogá*s. Acta Humana, 2018, 4. pp 103–120. https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/actahumana/article/view/949/300 (Downloaded: 2021-12-11), p. 108.

[33] Kant, Immanuel (1790/1997): *Az ítélőerő kritikája.* (ford. Papp Zoltán) Budapest, Ictus.

that have forced Fukuyama[34] to retract his earlier views on the realisation of global liberalism). Representatives of a national consciousness, as understood in civil law, will behave appropriately with representatives of cultures that are different from or in some respects hostile to them if they maintain a rational distance on critical issues, respecting the values and local customs of others, and only seek the type of relationship in which both parties are able to agree and comply with it - economic, political, tourist and all kinds of relations, with particular attention to the minimum representation of embassies.

2. The theoretical division of national identity so far

Kees Teszelszky provides the following theoretical divisions of national identity: 1) primordialists, 2) modernists, 3) ethnosymbolists, 4) constructivists.[35] Teszelszky refers to these terms in the order of their chronological development. For the purposes of his own scientific analysis, he joins the last one. At the end of this division we will have again an important philosophical architectonics.

1) Scholars of nationalism, called [perennialists], primordialists [primordialism], share the nationalists' view that national identity is a natural endowment (Herder Fichte), arising from the fundamental inequality between people. Primordialists believe that human history has been divided into nations from the very beginning, and that nationalism is therefore as old as humanity itself.[36] [37]

2./A.) In the 1960s, the modernist position developed in opposition to the primordialists.[38] This tendency was aimed at trimming the wild shoots of nationalism in the first half of the 20th century and still dominates research on nationalism today. Modernists accuse the primordialists of impliedly accepting nationalist ideology as a starting point, thus providing a kind of academic validation for nationalists. The modernist current is very diverse, but according to their followers both the nation and nationalism are modern phenomena. The ideology, they say, was born in the French Revolution as a consequence of modern processes such as capitalism, industrialisation, urbanisation, secularisation and the development of the bureaucratic state. According to the modernists, nationalism existed before the forming of nations.[39] In their view, certain factors existed before the modern era which led to the development of thinking about the nation at a later stage. By suggesting continuity, the idea of the nation creates a fictional link between the past and the present on historical grounds. It promotes group cohesion among citizens and justifies politics itself. It is here that Hobsbawm first uses the famous term 'invented

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[34] Fukuyama, Francis (2014): *A történelem vége és az utolsó ember*. Ford. Ábrahám Zoltán, Somogyi Pál László, M. Nagy Miklós. Európa, Budapest, 2014.

[35] Teszelszky 2009, pp 61-67. Mentions as source: For summary see: Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism. A Trend Report and Bibliography, in *Current Sociology,* XXI/3, Den Haag-Paris, 1973, pp 3-187; Tom de Meester, De exclusieve natiestaat. Pleidooi voor een constructivistische benadering van nationalisme en nationale identiteit, *Belgisch tijdschrift voor de nieuwste geschiedenis,* XXVII(1997); Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation,* New York, 1999, pp 473-537.

[36] Smith, Anthony D.: *Nations and nationalism in a global era,* Cambridge, 1995, p. 57.

[37] Teszelszky, 2009. p. 62.

[38] The most determining modernists are Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Karl Deutsch és Charles Tilly. See DE MEESTER, quoted piece, pp. 474-475.

[39] Hobsbawm shortly argues: „Nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalists but the other way round." Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality,* Cambridge, 1990, ²1992, p. 10.

tradition'.[40] [...] It also follows from Hobsbawm's theory that there was no idea of nation in the early modern period, because thinking about the nation was fundamentally different from older forms of group identity. What distinguishes nationalism, in his view, from other ideologies is the linking of the idea of the nation with a single language and the modern territorial form of government, the 'nation state'.[41] [...][42]

2./B.) The Irish anthropologist Benedict Anderson was the first modernist to argue that nationalism was, after all, rooted in the early modern period.[43] To justify his statement, he compared the development of nationalism with the development of religious thought. According to his definition, the nation is an artificial 'political community' that is limited (culturally, linguistically and ethnically defined) and sovereign (independent of a higher power).[44] The nation emerged in the early modern period along the lines of various political and religious changes, such as the Reformation. The reason for this, in his view, is that traditional political and religious communities were broken up and the holders of power, the church and the dynasty, lost their former legitimacy. It was as a result of this crisis, in this power vacuum, that the idea of the nation as a sovereign political community could emerge. In the early modern period, the idea of the nation was justified on the basis of history, which was examined not from the point of view of the church or the dynasty, but from the point of view of the nation.[45]

3) Since the 1980s, Anderson's views have inspired "ethnosymbolists", including Anthony Smith, who stresses the important role of culture in the development of the concept of nation.[46] Smith argues, in contrast to the modernists, that national identity emerged earlier than nationalism and it is therefore more complex a more complex phenomenon.[47] He also points out that an analogy can be drawn between national identity and the self-image of the individual. Indeed, people have different social roles and expressions of identity, determined by factors such as family, geography, class, religion, ethnicity and gender. What people have in common is what makes them a cultural community with its own identity. When such a group takes on a political character, nationalism emerges.[48] The forming of a nation involves the establishment of political institutions and a legal system, as well as territorial delimitation, guided by the history of the community.[49]

Smith emphasises the nation-building role of cultural expressions such as myths and symbols.[50] According to him, the nation develops from an 'ethnic core, by which he means the dominant group in society, which is assumed to have common origins and culture,[51] and which gradually absorbs new groups as it increases its social, territorial and political influence, thus becoming

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[40] Same, p. 1

[41] Same, pp 10-11

[42] Teszelszky, 2009. 62f

[43] Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, 1983, ²1994.

[44] Same, pp 5-6.

[45] Teszelszky, 2009. p. 64.

[46] See: Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity,* Cambridge, 1992

[47] Smith, *National Identity,* London, 1991, p. 72.

[48] Same, p. 8.

[49] Same, p. 81.

[50] Same, 5ff

[51] Same.

a nation. The common ground of the growing core becomes increasingly symbolic, what makes the newly formed nation even more unified. [52]

According to Smith, national identity is embodied by the way in which old symbols, myths, traditions and memories take on new meanings in the current context, which clearly justifies the existence of the concept of nation and the sovereignty of the nation. The weakness of Smith's theory lies in the empirical basis of his analysis of the concept of nation, which refers to vague, undefined cultural phenomena such as myths and symbols. [53]

4) The lack of a solid foundation for ethnosymbolism led to the emergence of the constructivist movement in the 1990s. The constructivist historian Tom de Meester argues that the idea of 'nation' must be separated from the concept of 'national identity'. The legitimating role of cultural factors - symbols, myths, traditions and memories - must play a central role in the study of the formation of national identity.[54] Following Anderson's example, De Meester argues that a nation should be defined as "an artificial community that cannot be reduced to facts."[55] On the basis of this definition, we should focus our attention on how the concept of nation has been given meaning in culture over time: the elite of a given community have created myths to legitimise the current social situation. Through such formations, an image of the community was created. The formation of a national identity is characterised by a change in the role of the image. [56] [57]

But Meester and his follower Véronique Lambert have clearer ideas about how to research the development of national identity in the early modern era and the concept of nation itself. Their method consists of examining the nation as an "artificial political community" in the way it appears in the works of historians.[58] In their view, we must start out from the way in which the concept of nation has been given meaning and has changed and transformed over time.[59] [...] The constructivist approach is often used in the study of the early modern period because it is based on the idea that the formation of national identity is not above everything. Following the psychologist Craig Calhoun, Lambert argues that individuals in the early modern period could have multiple identities at the same time, one of which was belonging to a nation.

In contrast to the primordialists, Véronique Lambert argues that national identity is not a self-evident phenomenon, nor is it solely a function of free will, as modernists see it, nor is it dependent on certain powerful symbols, as ethnosymbolists believe. The emergence of a national identity is the result of very specific political circumstances: a national myth emerges from certain cultural elements that are designed to legitimise the political message of the community. Through the creation of these community stories, the cultural community is transformed into a political community. This assumption is based on a political theory that

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[52] Same, p. 14

[53] Teszelszky, 2009. 64-65. o.

[54] De Meester, De exclusieve natiestaat. Pleidooi voor een constructivistische benadering van nationalisme en nationale identiteit, *Belgisch tijdschrift voor de nieuwste geschiedenis,* XXVII(1997), 473-537; Véronique Lambert, Methodologische beschouwingen bij het onder- zoek naar de concepten 'natie', 'nationalisme', en 'nationale identiteit' in de Middeleeuwen, *Jaarboek voor middeleeuwse geschiedenis, 4(2001), 66-68.*

[55] De Meester, *quoted book,* 482.

[56] Same, 483.

[57] Teszelszky, 2009. 65.

[58] Lambert, *quoted piece,* 66-85.

[59] De Meester, *quoted piece.,* 535.

legitimates the political claims of the community on the basis of its cultural characteristics and declares the community autonomous in the specific political context.[60] [61]

Following Teszelszky's presentation,[62] it is worth reflecting on what might be the theoretical contradiction that might simplify the identification of the two extremes from a philosophical point of view, while at the same time 'deepening' it. According to one - original - school of thought, the pristine "One" is the essence, which is unfolding and differentiating according to its nature. The other view, however, is that differentiated diversity already exists and that to trace it back to some primordial Oneness is an illusion. The former is the heir of the Platonic, Plotinian tradition, the latter starts from Kantian Criticism and then turns into a revolutionary and free idea. The former describes the world (sein), the latter wants to change it (sollen).

According to today's primordialists, the essence of the nation is that its members exist in an already given and indissoluble unity (an example of this from an emotional point of view is Max Scheler's *Einsfühlung*). Their simple argument is that if we strip away the substance and replace it with modes of operation, then the substance, which has become empty and stripped away, can be replaced and exchanged at any time by any 'trendy' mode of operation. But this is a mistake, even a sin.

3. Pro and contra opinions on national identity

Opinion is not the same as, and is very far from, the status of verified knowledge - as Socrates' maieutic method[63] (questioning and educating) has shown. Yet we are now looking at opinions. Keeping quiet is an obstacle to mutual understanding and communication in general, both in everyday life and in academic life. At the same time, in everyday life, with few exceptions, people tend to stand up for their own opinions and expect others to affirm and acknowledge them. (Hegel wrote about the importance of the 'struggle for recognition' in his narrative of the master-servant relationship in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the chapter on 'self-consciousness'[64] - a point echoed by Fukuyama[65]). But people often even conceal their motives, or are unable to articulate them accurately. They may not even admit it to themselves, or they may repress it subconsciously and, according to Freud's theory, use avoidance mechanisms.

Many people, especially the older generation, who themselves have suffered oppression from left or right-wing dictatorships, experience their sense of identity accordingly. With few exceptions, their descendants may have heard of these grievances and, because they could have happened to them, they also define themselves as being against one political ideology and being in favor of another. The family environment and the social environment are therefore essential in shaping consciousness. The school system can reinforce this, or even change it, depending on the preferences of the teachers. At the same time, the school and/or the circle of friends, even

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[60] De Meester, *quoted piece.,* 535.

[61] Teszelszky, 2009. 66f

[62] However, we have to note, that although Teszelszky borrows his methodology from the contructivists, but seeing his message today we would categorise him as a conservativist, i. e. he uses the theory of constructivist not for his intention, but for his methodology.

[63] In this topic see comprehensively Platon's works.

[64] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1961): *A szellem fenomenológiája.* Trans. Szemere, Samu. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest. pp. 101-107.

[65] Fukuyama, Francis (2014): *A történelem vége és az utolsó ember.* Trans. Ábrahám, Zoltán, Somogyi, Pál László, M. Nagy, Miklós. Európa, Budapest.

ones in the virtual space, also shape who has a sense of national identity. But ultimately, as an autonomous individual, each person has to consider what he/she chooses and why. As an adult, you hopefully already have established personality traits and don't rely on others to make your choices. The psychological stages of development take place one after the other, our experience expands, our attitudes are constantly being shaped, the intensity and pattern of our intellectual, perceptual and emotional preferences change.

What is the specific political-ideological motivation and purpose of certain political-ideological positions? I would like to start with the two - in terms of their intentions - strongest, but at the same time opposing, views:

a.) For those who care about their national identity, to call it a fictional "formation" is a degrading concept, it has nothing to do with eternity. But tradition derives from that which gives it faith, strength, endurance, self-confidence, companions, order, security, homeliness. What remains after the "enlightened" rational socio-historical deduction, dismantling, "exposing" of the "formation"? Emptiness. What can come in its place? Another construction, the current trend. But we lose tradition, identity and with it faith in eternity, strength and everything else. Superficial, minute connections, copies, deception and scams can be imagined. Hope is gone, the biblical Satan has won.

b.) According to critics who deliberately amortize national identity, the nations that still exist at the beginning of the 21st century, with their borders and sovereignty, are obsolete and a relic of the dark 20th century, a constant source of anxiety. In their view, people's minds must be changed, as they are the breeding ground for all historical ideas that they consider false (those who can be re-educated can remain, those who cannot should be expelled from society or at least silenced). To do this, however, living conditions must be changed, and diversity and acceptance must be propagated rather than the maintenance - or even the strengthening - of a sense of identity and national identity. Since, in the shorter or longer term, changes in the material environment generate new ideas of mind, this must be achieved by giving preference to the "other" over the old inhabitants with normal-average consciousness. Thus, in the shortest possible time, a weakening of national consciousness can be achieved by forcing the old population into a silent defensive position and by converting/educating the new generations. This is how they imagine the road to future world peace.

Here I would briefly mention Kant, in the second section of his "Perpetual peace", which " contains the definitive articles necessary for eternal peace between states", the following can be read. „The second definitive article for eternal peace: the law of nations must be based on the federalism of free states. This idea of federalism must gradually be extended to all states. And this is the way to eternal peace."[66] It is common finance, war, foreign affairs, leaving only the rest as self-determination to the nations. Such is the federalist vision of the EU today, with the addition that all should be ideologically identical.

The first is afraid of change, while the second is determined to restlessly change, fearing a repetition of historical tragedies (it is another matter that it was the strength of determination, combined with extreme ideologies, that allowed atrocities to be committed in the 20th century). The former, in European terms, is the heir of a pre-secular society and then of the capitalist system (although it could exist in a different structure), while the latter is primarily critical of

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[66] Kant, Immanuel (1795/1985): *Az örök békéhez.* (Trans. Babits Mihály), Európa, Budapest. (Mérleg)
http://www.mek.iif.hu/porta/szint/tarsad/filoz/tiszta/html/01.htm#cim1 (Downloaded: 2021-12-12)

the social system (as a structure) and is not satisfied with the economic status quo either. The happy medium might be to allow the scientific mind to explore the historical roots, but not to tear at the heart of national identity. And this regardless of whether we 'speak to us' as something inherent - eternal in its emotionally justified values - or whether we attribute the positions taken to an elite and they impose their principles on a global society, not just a local one, by various methods, or whether one simply represents them as an ordinary person.

4. Fractures and reflections on national consciousness

Zsuzsanna Agora[67] gave a conference presentation titled "Language as an identity-forming medium - from the perspective of historical psychology" on 19 October 2021[68], hosted by the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Center for Humanities, more specifically by the "Research Group of Practical Philosophy and Classical Tradition", which organised workshops on the concept of classical tradition. In this lecture, Zsuzsanna Agora, who had previously researched the psychology of German Nazism[69], mentioned the following main splits concerning our topic:

1) cognitive and emotional perception,
2) past versus future,
3.) "We" versus "others".

I will convert this to national identity and its conscious representation, national consciousness, and then explain these in a simplified and abbreviated way; all this beforehand, before and without using my formal-logical table.

1) According to the first split emotional overheating can dominate the mind, but the reverse can also be true. Levinas, for example, says that the intellect absorbs the intelligible and thus dominates it, totalizing itself.[70] I will give a general example, and at the same time demonstrate the validity of the philosophy of the '3 registers' (sense-perception-emotion), which will be used later.

It is our experience in life that if someone is overly emotional, we clamour for reason, but if they display a cold and dry logic, we miss their emotional tenderness. From this alone it is clear that in ourselves we make a precise distinction between reason and emotion, which exist in themselves - in their modes of being given - as first philosophies, that is, as self-evident metaphysics. We miss the other aspect - the life-belt of agreement - yet they act on their own, running in and out of their unsteady base, never letting go of their anchorage. Then, if we treat emotions - like the senses - in philosophy on their own as an appearance-giving, then the register of emotions can be justifiably introduced into philosophical discourse as a third register alongside the old dualism of reason and phisicality.

[67] University of Pécs, hum of Pedagology and Culture
[68] The workshops of the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Center for the Humanities on the definition of classical tradition titled "Research Group of Practical Philosophy and Classical Tradition"
[69] Agora Zsuzsanna (2020): *A nácizmus történeti pszichológiája*. Kronosz.
[70] Levinas (1999): *Teljesség [totalitás] és végtelen. Tanulmány a külsőről*; (Trans. Tarnay László), Jelenkor, Pécs.

We then say that man is like a leaf, whose visible colour (perception), is his body, whose braid is his intellect[71], and whose vein is his emotions. Each of these exists in its own right, has its own metaphysics - as the first philosophy -, its own starting point, but none of them exists in itself, it is only the totality of their conformation which characterises the abilities of a given personality. It is through these three human abilities that everything is given, whether it flows from the outside in or from the inside out. Everything else is a "mixture" of these three.

In terms of national identity and consciousness, one can be cold and calculating, or emotionally blind. Intellectually, one can use national identity for one's own purpose, to gain an advantage (through sophistical stratification or healthy competition), but equally as a leader of a nation, in a global competition of peoples. The situation is somewhat different with emotional identity, which is radically separated, in terms of its real or pretended position in the experience, into acting in the wrong sense and sincere, noble emotion, pathetic self-affection (Henry[72]). The latter is the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the good of the community, but we must be careful with this, because a mind disturbed to the point of blindness is capable of self-sacrifice even if it has no specific national defence aims, but is 'only' motivated by fanaticism and terror. It is therefore worth paying attention to Aristotle's 'golden mean'.[73]

2) The second aspect is the conflict between past and future. Zsuzsanna Agora asks what we can use group cohesion for. For good or for bad? In her view, melancholy is not useful because it leads to narcissism, so people go forward but look back. So, according to Zsuzsanna Agora, melancholy that turns into narcissism is not the solution to problems.

Albert and Zempléni mention Gellner's interpretation of national identity and narcissism:

> 'National identity is a communal, we- or self-consciousness that feeds itself regularly and systematically, and which would presumably not exist without the means of constant self-feeding and self-presentation. From national iconography to poetry and the landscape representation of national space, self-portrayal and self-cult are symptomatic or structural features of national identity. This systematic 'narcissism' - so aptly judged by Ernest Gellner (1983)[74] - does distinguish national identity from other forms of collective identity.[75]

Exaggerated narcissism for its own sake is indeed not the solution to move beyond the melancholy of mourning the past, but the glorious past gives strength to the nation, and not only the victories but also the endurance and struggle in almost impossible circumstances strengthen the nation's sense of justice and desire for freedom. This is not narcissism lamenting the past, but respect for past generations. If the present generation does not respect those who stood up as heroes for future generations, then we who live today cannot have a legitimate claim to be respected when we sacrifice for future generations. For the nation is a union of the living, the

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[71] Husserl wrote about a transcendental ego, which we can roughly call the old mind, the Kantian intellect, but but only the given contexts have meanings, for example, hearing the sound of a particular flute, the sound of which is highlighted by our attention from the orchestra, or sitting in a chair and leaning on the table while listening to music, etc., with all its implications, expectations, and the possibility of describing our duration in detail.

[72] Henry, Michel (2013): *Az élő test.* (Trans. Farkas Henrik, Moldvay Tamás, Sajó Sándor, Ullmann Tamás) Pannonhalma, Bencés Kiadó.

[73] Aristotle (1971): *Nikomakhoszi etika.* (Trans.: Szabó Miklós, jegyzeteket írta: Simon Endre). Magyar Helikon, Budapest.

[74] Gellner, Ernest (1983), *Nations and nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell

[75] Albert Réka és Zempléni András (2002): *A nemzeti identitás sajátosságairól.* 172. m.p. In: Fedinec Csilla (ed.) 2002.: Társadalmi önismeret és nemzeti önazonosság Közép-Európában. Teleki László Alapítvány, Budapest. pp. 167-176.

dead and the unborn (Burke[76]). Furthermore, there is a great difference between a people defeated in defence of its homeland, as the Hungarians have so often experienced, and in a war of conquest. Every people has a different history, habitus and destiny, and it is not possible to extend a psychological description suitable for one nation to all the others. For example, one should not confuse the conquering narcissism of Nazism, based on pre-Germanic myths, with the discontent and resulting outrage of the Hungarians, based on their legitimate sense of justice (a series of defeated liberation struggles, and then the Germans who started World War II, reunited as one country, while nobody cares about the grievances of the Hungarians - see the Treaty of Trianon). How could the trampled memory of the ancient Hungarian warriors not have been accompanied by national melancholy? Of course, it's another thing again for those who are stuck in self-pity and give way to their anger than for those who are working on 'building' in all fields, including the re-establishment of a desecrated national identity.

The difference between re-establishment[77] and reconstruction in terms of national identity is that while the latter seeks to 'bring back' one by one from the collective memory something that has been destroyed, re-establishment goes back to the roots and starts from there, so that it is essentially based on the same foundations, but selects collective/individual memories in such a way that it is still functional as a whole in the contemporary context. The re-establishment thus creates something essentially identical, it seeks to create a national consciousness that gives a sense of home, but in every detail of its execution it strives for an identity that can be adapted to the contemporary, otherwise it will be atavistic, old-fashioned and boring.

3) Albert and Zempléni define well what is usually meant by the contrast between "us" and "others" when discussing national identity:

> The study of the concept of collective identity also raises a [...] [further] problem, because it involves not only the ambiguity caused by the difference between the external view and self-consciousness (or self-knowledge), but also a paradox that could be called trivial: it must inevitably define alterity, otherness, without which there is neither self-consciousness nor self-identity. Comparing to what, to whom and/or against whom are we who and what we are? This is the more or less hidden key question of all collective identities, be it the ethnicity redefined by Frederik Barth, whose continuity depends on the invisible border between neighbouring peoples along which they repeatedly recodify their cultural differences, or be it the European nations, whose defining and dynamic contrastivity was already recognised and emphasised by Marcel Mauss in 1920. In the same way, the question of "what is Hungarian?" before yesterday, today or tomorrow depends as much on what is German, Russian, Jewish or Romanian in the given age as on the activity of

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[76] Quotes: Pongrácz Alex: *A nacionalizmus fogalma és jellemzői*. In: Anthologia Hungarica p. 25. (ed. Szabó Ádám) Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, pp. 19-30. https://nkerepo.uni-nke.hu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/15935/Anthologia%20Hungarica.pdf;jsessionid=1B0DC9EAD2D8A3ABBD3C94CCA1AF806B?sequence=3 (Downloaded: 2021-11-29)

[77] The philosophical idea of Husserl and Heidegger (erneuerte Urstiftung - renewed primordial foundation) was also used by Tengelyi in his works, a term originally introduced in the context of the study of ancient geometry: one must not only be able to apply a formalised version of a mathematical theorem, but one must go back to the proof of the theorem, to its logical understanding, otherwise one does not understand its essential structure. See mainly: Husserl, Edmund (1998): *Az európai tudományok válsága I-II. kötet,* Budapest, Atlantisz. (Trans.: Berényi Gábor és Mezei Balázs (main part), Egyedi András (Appendix I-III.), Ullmann Tamás (Appendix IV-XXIX.). Revised translations, standardised terminology, afterword, biography and notes written by Mezei Balázs.); Heidegger, Martin (2003): *A világkép kora.* in: Rejtekutak. (translated: Ábrahám Zoltán, Bacsó Béla, Czeglédi András, Kocziszky Éva, Pálfalusi Zsolt, Schein Gábor), Osiris Kiadó, Budapest. pp. 70-103.

what is called national "introspection", which the greats of the nation so nobly and almost obligatorily restart practicing in a repeated way in every age. [78]

The contrast between "us" and "others" in the context of a certain national identity means that "we", that is, the brothers and sisters of the nation, stand together when others - other nation/s - are agitating and warring against us. This is an expression of the power of internal identity. Of course, in times of peace, through the trade between nations, tourism, diplomatic relations, etc., there is not opposition but cooperation between different types of nations. Optimally, each is seen as an equal, and mutually beneficial (win-win) relationships are established between the many different nations. The self-consciousness of nations should not be confused with each other and thus eliminated, homogenised, as this would in the long run work against diversity, intensifying internal conflicts. Those who believe that the radicalised Kantian concept of world citizenship and world peace can be extended to all nations simply fail to take into account that some religions have not yet been enlightened and secularised at all, while others have only partially been enlightened and secularised. Certain peoples, nations, belong to larger groupings, and some of these larger cultural/civilizational alliances have already taken this step in favour of a scientific worldview, but there are larger groupings where there is no sign of this. The aspect of scientific progress in terms of world conquest is now fading as the technical advantage seems to dry up with the ability to buy, and the concerns about human rights of 'enlightened' peoples put great pressure on democratically elected governments every few years. All this is forcing the Western powers to refrain from conquest in the present, and their only advantage in the financial market is beginning to dry up.

By contrast, religious groups with a completely opposite cultural orientation and a strong religious dogma and commitment are gaining ground for spreading their own religion precisely by invoking the human rights in the West (freedom of religion and opinion). As regards the agitation technique of the foot in the door, we can refer to the old fable and say that the door of the piglet's house is already wide open.

The result can be either the self-abandonment and self-absolution of Western culture, or a turn back towards their own religion. Religious challenge can only be met with religious response and conflict emerges where reason is no match for the conquering believers, who see the 'others' – i.e. Western civilisation - as a bunch of worthless, unclean 'pig-eaters'.

The clash of cultures and civilisations (Huntington[79]) has been going on for thousands of years, with no definite beginning or end. The global situation, problem and challenge to all kinds of ardent naivety is that whichever civilisation or nation is weakened in one way or another, the others will strike - the exception being only in the case of very strong cohesion. This is called realpolitik.

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[78] Albert Réka és Zempléni András (2002): *A nemzeti identitás sajátosságairól.* p. 168. In: Fedinec Csilla (ed.) 2002.: Társadalmi önismeret és nemzeti önazonosság Közép-Európában. Teleki László Alapítvány, Budapest. pp. 167-176.

[79] Huntington wrote about this in detail: Huntington, Samuel P. (1998/2018): *A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása.* (trans. Puszta Dóra, Gázsity Mila, Gecsényi Györgyi)*,* Európa, Budapest.

5. Contemporary German perception: self-absorption at the altar of guilt? An analysis of the concept of national identity, the role of emotions, the possibility of re-establishment and the current political situation.

Unfortunately, by 2021, the elected leaders of Germany's population have broken with almost all forms of national thinking and traditional community identity. The Hungarian Prime Minister wrote about this in December 2021 as follows:

> The migration crisis was a major test in itself. It became a Rubicon because it exposed deep philosophical, political and emotional differences between us about the nation, freedom and the role of Germany.
>
> It revealed that for Hungarians and other Central Europeans, the homeland is immanent, the nation is the origin, without patriotism there can be no healthy emotional life. It turned out that Germans are on the other path of European civilisation, towards a kind of post-Christian and post-national state.[80]

It is an interesting phenomenon that the German-language Wikipedia entry[81] on national identity starts with Benedict Anderson, who treats the concept of the nation as a fiction, and does not even mention any other positions that might affirm national identity. Anderson's original book from 1983 is entitled *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. The four characteristics of a nation, according to Anderson, are: 1) imagined, 2) defined by borders, 3) sovereign, and 4) made up of the people of a nation:

> 1) It is "imaginary [...] because even the members of the smallest nation will never know the majority of the others [...] but the idea of their community is in the minds of all. [...] In fact, any community that is larger than the personal relations of the villagers is an imaginary community."
> 2.) "Limited [...] because even the largest [...] live within well-defined, though changing, borders beyond which lie other nations. [...] Even the most enthusiastic nationalists do not dream of the day when all members of the human race will belong to their nation" - in contrast to religious communities with a mission of spreading faith such as Christianity.
> 3) "Sovereign, because its concept was born at a time when the Enlightenment and the Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the hierarchical-dynastic [sic] empires conceived by the grace of God. [...] The measure and symbol of this freedom is the sovereign state."
> 4) It is a "community [...] because it can be understood as a "comradely" association of equals, regardless of real inequality and exploitation.[82]

According to Benedict Anderson, the nation is an "imagined political community"[83], i.e. a fiction, an economically and politically motivated cultural construct, an imaginary thing, existing only in the mind. From this point of view, he is one of the most interesting opponents of the idea of national identity and the consciously represented national consciousness, but as interesting and 'Blickfang' as it seems at first sight, it is easy to disprove it, if only one reads

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[80] https://www.miniszterelnok.hu/szamizdat-14/ (downloaded: 2021-12-09)
[81] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationale_Identit%C3%A4t (downloaded: 2021-11-16)
[82] Anderson:, Benedict (1998): *Die Erfindung der Nation.*
[83] Anderson 1983, p. 6.

Bishop Berkeley[84]. What is any form in thought if not an idea, that is, some constituted, i. e. formed form, if it's not conscious? It is, of course, nonsense for an idea as an idea to have a material reality, since everyone's ideas and critical thinking (according to Descartes' basic principle[85]) are in themselves ideal - in the old Anglo-Saxon sense of the term - that is, mental. The accusation of fiction against national identity and its replacement by materialist-historical reasoning - Anderson says that national identity is an anomaly for Marxists[86] - is a blatant category mistake, as Ryle mentioned in his example of the university.[87] Gilbert Ryle[88] says: I don't see the university, only lecture halls, dormitories, libraries, etc. - this is not to say that there is no university, but to describe it through its constituent parts. The university is a concept in itself, just as the nation is a concept in itself, but we know what it means, because the concept merely objectifies all the constituent parts under one concept in order to speed up communication. In the same way, consciousness does not exist in itself, nor is it nothing in itself, it is only a name, but at the same time it is the sum of our three faculties, and in the same way, our personality does not exist in itself, but is itself the intensity relief of the three registers (sense-perception-emotion) - but it is given as a concept, a phenomenon.

From an anthropological point of view, Réka Albert and András Zempléni, in a 2002 conference presentation on national identity - organized by the Teleki László Institute - said the following:

> Somewhat complementing Benedict Anderson's (1983) classic definition of nation, we can argue that the nation is not only an "imagined" community, but also a community to be experienced primarily emotionally, which owes its unity or - paradoxically - its disintegration to its very diverse and effective emotion-arousing tools. [...] in contrast to the [former] 'traditional' social consciousness, national identity is structurally and organisationally emotional.[89]

But let's not forget that there are intellectual, perceptual and emotional aspects to everything, although for some it may be one or the other that dominates. National identity can only be

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[84] Berkeley, George: T*anulmány az emberi megismerés alapelveiről és más írások*;introduction, notes Faragó Szabó István, selected Altrichter Ferenc, trans. Faragó Szabó István, Fehér Márta, Vámosi Pál; Gondolat, Bp., 1985 *(Gondolkodók)*; L'Harmattan, Bp., 2006 *(Argumentum)*

[85] Descartes, Rene (1994): *Elmélkedések az első filozófiáról* (trans., utószó: Boros Gábor), Atlantisz Könyvkiadó, Budapest.

[86] Anderson 1983, p. 3.

[87] Ryle's "university", as an example - referring to category confusion - the new student sees the buildings, but not the university as an institution. "A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time will be shown a number of colleges, libraries, sports grounds, museums, science departments and administrative offices. And then the foreigner asks: 'But where is the university? I have seen where the members of the colleges live, where the quaestors work, where the scientists do their experiments and so on. But I have not seen the university where the members of the university live and work.' It will have to be explained to him that the university is not another substitute institution, not some additional equivalent or counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices he has seen. The university is just the way in which everything he has seen is organised. If you have seen those things, and if you understand their connection, you have seen the university. His error lies in the naive assumption that it was irreproachable and right to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum and the University, that is, to speak of "the University" as if it were some separate member of the class of which these other entities were members. He has wrongly placed the University in the same category as the other institutions." Ryle 1999, p. 23

[88] Ryle, Gilbert (1999): *A szellem fogalma.* (trans. Altrichter Ferenc) Budapest, Osiris

[89] Albert Réka és Zempléni András (2002): *A nemzeti identitás sajátosságairól.* p. 174. In: Fedinec Csilla (ed.) 2002.: Társadalmi önismeret és nemzeti önazonosság Közép-Európában. Teleki László Alapítvány, Budapest. pp. 167-176.

defined by our intellect, our perception and our emotions, but it is not fiction, it is not made up, because then everything else is too.

Let us look at this somewhat philosophically with a 'simple' example. A „'table' as a definition and idea in mind is the collection of things we find suitable to function as a table. What are its properties? It can have 4 or more legs, but also 3, 2, or 1, it can be blocky, lattice-like, suspended, etc., and it can be made of almost any solid material. Its surface can be small, large, smooth, bumpy, depending on what you want to use it for: writing on it, putting a hammer on it, etc. - and of course the surface can be made of almost any solid material, or it can be created by other futuristic means: magnetism, gases, pressure, light engineering, etc. But a table can be not only something made in some way, but also a natural object, a large stone, a piece of wood, etc. And we have not even mentioned the visual representation of a table, i.e. the status of the naming of the representing entity, which is a linguistic question. It is clear from all this that it is almost impossible to say exactly whether or not this or that is a table, here and now. It mostly depends on its use (this was Heidegger's idea[90]). So when we want to use something for something, we will immediately know whether it is a table or not, and that this table is "here" and thus given to me as a phenomenon (the latter is already philosophically undeniable according to Husserl).

The table, as a generalising conceptual "idea", is therefore a collective term that serves as a generalising definition, replacing precise description, and thus practically speeding up communication. It is therefore a designation, a concept, which has been abstracted by the conscious mind's compulsion to select. Plato took this to the point of regarding ideas as eternals existing in the world of ideas beyond the mind, since his aim was ethical persuasion, for which purpose he sought to make the 'Good' as the supreme idea an eternal guiding principle. (It is important to note here that Greek thought was static, i.e. they did not recognise the possibility of genetic explication, either in natural or conceptual species/genera.) Prior to his encounter with Socrates, the young Plato was a Pythagorean, and preached the eternity of numbers, transposed this to ethical concepts, and thus, coherently stuck in his theory, asserted it with respect to material realities. Plato's ideas on materialities are therefore incidental, rather mere consequences of his theory.

So if concepts serve the practical acceleration of communication, and are simplistic symbolic markers resulting from the objectification of consciousness, how is it possible to have feelings about them? It is easier to define this first in relation to the tangibles. A table that belonged to my grandmother, now deceased, is placed in my mind (Bergson[91]) according to the value of my love for my grandmother - and, by extension, her love for me. If I now think of this table - which is in my dining room - then all the sensual-perceptual-emotional associative (or even repressive, etc.), relations of my mind are also gathered according to my present situation, my attunement (Heidegger[92]). If I go outside and turn up the tablecloth, I see the corner I painted as a child, and suddenly everything is recalled, "atmospheric feelings", deep emotions "take hold of me". So it is understandable how an object can have a concrete emotional character.

If we could provide the table itself as a concept referring to materiality with an example of an emotional "charge" that is authentic and duration-like, then this is even more justified in relation

[90] Heidegger, Martin (2001): *Lét és Idő.* (trans. Vajda Mihály, Angyalosi Gergely, Bacsó Béla, Kardos András, Orosz István), Osiris Kiadó, Budapest.
[91] Bergson, Henri (1923): *Idő és szabadság.* (trans. Dienes Valéria), Franklin-Társulat, Budapest.
[92] Heidegger, Martin (2001): *Lét és Idő.* (trans. Vajda Mihály, Angyalosi Gergely, Bacsó Béla, Kardos András, Orosz István), Osiris Kiadó, Budapest.

to "mental" formations - as in the case of objects and emotions - since they are ontologically closer to each other at first sight, since both are invisible, "merely" actively/passively manifested by conscious/unconscious will.

In the nation, national identity and its assumed quality, national consciousness is also manifested intellectually, both in our perceptions and emotions, but beyond its material qualities (domestic tastes, landscapes, folk costumes, flags, monuments, etc.) and the emotions associated with them, there are also non, or only partially - literally symbolic ones: in language, writing, sound, film reels, other media, etc. - which are recorded through letters or other media of representation, but which rather carry some kind of 'soul', emotional charge, which is experienced and appropriated through teaching-learning, at the will of someone, in some institutionalised structure, or sometimes in private education, upbringing. And between the material manifestation and the entities recorded by some medium, there are the acts and activities manifested in the process, such as a folk song sung in one's own language, a poem recited, a folk dance danced, a Hungarian play performed, all of which can cause catharsis "here and now" (Aristotle - Poetics), i.e. "elevate the soul". And these are usually sung, danced and acted with the right spirit, authentically and organically living in their duration, by the brothers and sisters of the nation - or they fight and stand as heroes in the battle (because the latter cannot be left out of the list of activities).

The notion of the nation itself as a super- or supra-concept brings all these together, and *national identity is thus understood as a complex spirit, as a call-word in itself, as a body of nations that share it and 'act it out' and 'fight it'. This is the essence of the national tradition.*

After this little philosophical digression, I return to the question of whether nation and national identity are imaginary constructs, some kind of fiction, or more than that. If by "imagined" we mean trying to uncover, for understanding and description, the genesis, the genetic phenomenology of national identity and self-identity within a given society, then it sounds more acceptable. However, 'merely' historical exposition is not enough, because we need to look at the national character and its self-conscious identity-image as a 'soul', a 'spirituality', not only in its periodic stages, but as a whole. There has always been some kind of community in which we have existed, but its forms have always changed, while at the same time it has always had its current 'form'. Each people had a different moment of self-articulation of national feeling, whether it was actively fomented or passively, eventfully - or perhaps some form of both at the same time.

What is undeniable, however, is that the autocratic dominance of nationalism can lead to authoritarian dictatorship in the same way as left-wing revolutions, religious fanaticism, paradoxically - through its wild sprouts - liberalism, as well as technicism, dataism[93], eugenics, and any exaggerated ideology or other type of one-sided perspective. However, the fact that a society once, generations ago, overstretched its boundaries and its leaders did not shy away from mass murder in their radicalism does not mean that today they should completely abandon their national identity - or radically regress to some vestigial form of it - but, on the contrary, that they should rediscover and rebuild their own communal and individual identity, their sense of identity, through their finest traditions. Csepeli proposes something similar.

> Acknowledging the psychological and sociological reality of identity consciousness, therefore, and recognising the objectivity and importance of national frameworks in today's

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[93] Yuval Noah Harari (2015/2017): *Homo Deus – a holnap rövid története*. (transl. Torma Péter), Animus, Budapest, 337ff

world, we are right to offer ideological national identity patterns of thought-consciousness, the totality of which can be described as democratic national identity. By this we mean that in social communication we must pay increased attention to the specific problems of national existence, but on the basis of a concept of nation that is open to the values and "self-evidentness" of other nations, that does not close but opens the way to identification with humanity and falls within the main line of social progress. National identity in this sense is critical by virtue of its self-cognitive character, capable of taking account of both the positive and the negative within the national "universe" and of deflecting conflicts and tensions towards crisis-forming actions and deeds.[94]

The solution is not a 'culture' of 'nobodies' or 'anybodies' (Greenfield[95]), since neither provides a sense of home, only superficial satisfactions of desire, not a self-emotive life (Henry[96]) with pathos-like values. It is the emotion of the life that is full of pathos, that is 'infinitely' and undeniably one's own, and it is this metaphysics of emotion that we represent in relation to the emotional register. This is only reinforced by Scheler's emotional *a priori* starting point in the 1916 manuscript *Ordo amoris*. He speaks of a "realm" that has and exists as much of an autonomous right as reason or perception, and even determines them. He considers the proper human emotional attitude in terms of the metaphysical ladder of values: we should have less devotion towards lesser values and more devotion towards greater/higher divine values. Let us summarise Scheler's commonly used hierarchy of values:

Table 1: Ranking of values

Ranking	Value	Emotional act	Ideal	Community
1.	holy-unholy	personal love	saint	community of faith
2.	beautiful-ugly right-wrong true-fake	emotion of soul	artist legislator philosopher	nation
3.	noble-ordinary	sense of living	hero	community of life
4.	pleasant-irritating	sensual emotion	someone who enjoys life	mass

Source: Kunzmann-Burkard-Wiedmann (1999)[97]

To deviate from this - as an aspirational value ladder - is an emotional mistake, a problem, because the heart has its own laws. And of all the emotions, the highest type of love stands out. The position of the fictitious notion of nation can be attributed to the self-reproach and remorse of the Germanic people for the atrocities of the 20th century, but across generations it is more like an ancient Greek tragedy in which the curse is passed down through generations. From today's point of view, it is a futility, a total self-abandonment, not a repair but a denial of their national identity, which, as a deviation from the Aristotelian golden mean, cannot in itself promise to bring any redemptive rewards. All this tells us about the Germans of the early 21st century is that they are thinking in extremes just like before - this time in terms of tolerance -

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[94] Csepeli 1993. Quotes: Bordás Sándor (2019): Az agresszív kód – Etnikai konfliktusok feltárása, kezelési lehetőségei, előrejelzése és kommunikációs háttere. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest .

[95] Susan Greenfield (2009): *Identitás a XXI. században*; trans. Garai Attila; HVG Könyvek, Budapest.

[96] Henry, Michel (2013): *Az élő test.* (trans. Farkas Henrik, Moldvay Tamás, Sajó Sándor, Ullmann Tamás) Pannonhalma, Bencés Kiadó.

[97] Kunzmann-Burkard-Wiedmann 1999, p. 196.

but that this kind of thinking is not preferred by the jury of world history. The deeper today's Germans bow their heads before groups of people of other religions and cultures for Christian-style forgiveness, the easier the fate that history has in store for them will be. Moreover, it is not religious people, the overwhelming majority of whom suffered the Holocaust, in front of whom they are currently humbling themselves, but precisely those who view Judaism with a minimum of 'antipathy'. Apology is not self-sacrifice, and certainly not false self-deprecation or a false sense of mission. Today, it is no longer the Germans who integrate the other religions they have received, but the other way round:

1. Picture: „Integrate white woman!"

Someone found it posted on the B1 motorway in Dortmund, Germany, and was blown away by the words "Integrate white woman! Dress [in chador] with respect for other cultures and be sensitive to the religious feelings of discriminated minorities! Everyday racism starts with the way you dress!"

A culture that functions well as a civilisation in their far-off homeland, but which is alien here in Europe, abuses the very language of the self-reproach of the Germans and makes despised laughing stock of German society, treating them as ridiculous prey animals, while the Germans applaud and do not understand what is happening to them.

It is worth mentioning one of Huntington's ideas, which is still valid today:

> We are living in an era of the emergence of a new world order based on civilisations: countries with cultural relations are cooperating with each other; efforts to transfer societies

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[98] https://badog.blogstar.hu/2021/11/05/ime-a-veg/113370/?fbclid=IwAR1rMfRkASg3QUn2xEAGorSnuqd1Wt7ElZA37wfFtuCCh7yroYsmB5iDtB0 (Downloaded: 05-11-2021)

> from one civilisation to another are failing; countries are clustering around core states that are leading or are seen as the centre of their own civilisation.[99]

In other words, the 'Western' states, wrongly imagining the feasibility of a world peace – which according to Oszkár Jászi, that was once due in 1000 years' time by a homogenised society - are now seeking to establish (as the accelerated Leninist socio-economic permanent - continuous, even double - revolution, which, despite Marx's admonitions, is thus theoretically doomed to failure), by which the Western philanthropists will run into a naivety of rights and a naivety of humanity. The redeemers of humanity celebrate the total self-abandonment of their chosen communities, instead of first 'redeeming' their own direct environment. Let us add that they do all this under the banner of diversity. The overly accepting nations are consciously, willfully suffocating themselves in the hope of a highly questionable naïve ideology, which in turn has irreversible consequences. An interesting question arises here, among others: if it is not an ideology based on economic interests that have been imposed by others, what is the optimal expected outcome?

If there are many Muslims in Europe and mosques everywhere, will we Europeans not want to be subjugated by war, and will we not want to subjugate others - since the latter will not be democratically feasible? But it is also possible that, sooner or later, demographically and in accordance with democratic principles, they will dominate in terms of opinion-forming, and then the host minority that is left behind will demand European-liberal rights within the 'Sharia', which is obviously naive. There is no shortage of militant religiously motivated experiences in Europe. The immune system of European self-defence has been weakened, Europe has become a prey animal. All we have to do is give ourselves up. But what about those of other religions? That seems to be irrelevant. Where will the feminist activists be then, who today still enjoy civil rights but may occasionally find themselves in the position assigned to them by religion?

Do the extreme liberals think that world peace can be brought about if there are no nationality/family/identity issues within nations - all of which are fraught with complex problems - but that everything is abolished and uniformised? But what if Huntington is right and civilisation issues cannot be swept aside?

Does national identity need to be saved or does it save itself? This can be converted to the question of personal and communal identity itself: are we 'nobodies', 'anybodies' (Susan Greenfield - *Identity in the 21st century*[100]), or are our values and guiding principles rooted in eternity?

Perhaps the freedom so much talked about by philosophers (Hegel[101], Schelling[102], ...) is no longer worth anything? Have the freedom and diversity of peoples been devalued, their meaning emptied of meaning? Is this what they want to tell us, to trivialise and relativise everything in the naive hope of uniting peoples in the utopia of world peace, or is it merely an ideological bluff, a misguided thesis of the economic elite? Should everything and everyone be

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[99] Huntington, Samuel P. (1998/2018): A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása. (trans. Puszta Dóra, Gázsity Mila, Gecsényi Györgyi), Európa, Budapest, p. 11

[100] Susan Greenfield (2009): *Identitás a XXI. században*; trans. Garai Attila; HVG Könyvek, Bp.

[101] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1961): *A szellem fenomenológiája.* (trans. Szemere Samu), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó.

[102] Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (1809/2010): *Filozófiai vizsgálódások az emberi szabadság lényegéről és az ezzel összefüggő tárgyakról.* (trans. Boros Gábor és Gyenge Zoltán) Attraktor, Máriabesenyő-Gödöllő.

homogenised, uniformised, so that there is no longer a battle of values in the markets and so that profits can be maximised? "Let every flower bloom!" - but only one kind? Is this not a self-contradiction in the thinking of the exaggerated, radical tolerance-warriors? Who is enlightened and who is biodiversity? What awaits a society that has lost all faith and illusions? In what new ideology will it 'live out' its sense of mission if it has completely dismantled the past? Will the ideology of a minority once again be imposed on the majority for some 'noble', world-changing purpose? "The road to hell is paved with good will!" This is a wise saying of the much experienced Hungarians.

We cannot predict what Europe will become, but we can predict where it is now. It suffices to mention what the European Commissioner for Equal Opportunities (Maltese Labour's Helena Dalli), citing the sensitivity of 'others', had planned to do in her communication guide of 26 October 2021[103] - but was postponed for the time being due to public outcry. Among other things, the European Commission's communication guide called on its staff to refrain from using the word "Christmas" and instead use the term "winter break". A complete 'rephrasing' has been prepared, which, among other things, provides specific ideological education and sets corresponding expectations for employees.

What the Pope has said about this is instructive:

> According to Pope Francis, Christmas has already been wished to be abolished by several dictatorships and is therefore anachronistic. A Cypriot journalist (6 December 2021) asked about a European Union document which proposed to abolish the term Christmas and to avoid the names of Joseph and Mary in order to avoid gender neutrality and discrimination. Pope Francis said this was an anachronism. Many dictatorships in history have tried this. Think of Napoleon, the Nazi dictatorship and then the Communist dictatorship. This is diluted laicity, distilled water. But history has proven that it doesn't work. The European Union, on the other hand, must follow the ideals of the founding fathers: ideals of unity, of greatness, and beware of allowing ideological colonialism to enter. This could divide the Member States and lead to the disintegration of the Union. The European Union must respect the internal structure and diversity of all its Member States, not equalise them. I think," the Pope added, "that he will not do it, that was not his intention, but watch out, because sometimes plans like this one come along and they are not up to the job. Each country has its own particular image, but each is open to the other. The European Union has its own sovereignty, a union of sovereign brothers and sisters that respects the uniqueness of each Member State. It must be careful not to become a channel for ideological colonialism. The document on Christmas is therefore anachronistic.[104]

Attila Szombath (PPKE Institute of Philosophy) gave a conference lecture entitled "*Value and Tradition*" on 19 October 2021, organised by the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Research Centre for the Humanities, where he argued that the ideology of the European Union today is limited to the values of freedom and the principle of harm (Do no harm to others - the equivalent of equality), but that this is too little because solidarity does not follow from them. According to him, the choice of value based on equality is a weak argument because cognition

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[103] https://szegedma.hu/2021/11/karacsony-helyett-inkabb-tel-unnepet-javasolt-az-unios-bizottsag-a-tiltakozas-miatt-visszavontak-az-egeszet-egyelore and in English:: https://www.fdesouche.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/guidelines-for-Inclusive-communication.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3bvZPx1dQqaXZRK5k4aPCJzQOuCJPi4v36PEjCNrwoPHXqN8aVadUxoMk (Downloaded 14-12-2021)
[104] https://www.vaticannews.va/hu/papa/news/2021-12/ferenc-papa-eu-dokumentum-karacsony-eltorlese-anakronizmus.html (downloaded: 11-12-2021)

without commitment is not possible. Absolute grounding is needed. Szombath argues that the gap between fact and value can be bridged. I myself have made this claim about Henry and Scheler.

6. About integration in Hungary

Hungary's territorial location, as the south-eastern border region of Europe, has always exposed it to conquering military invasions over the past 1000 years, so it is no wonder that in every campaign against the Hungarians, as many men as possible were killed, and unmarried women and women and their daughters deprived of their husbands were used for "their purposes". How is it possible that this country, which has suffered so much, has managed to survive and even integrate the 'others'? The mothers raised their children to love their own country, even when the war was raging and even more so when the war had passed. Hungary has always welcomed the "others" when they approached with good intentions, building their future and the country. Ethnogenetic mixing was and is ongoing.[105]

In this multi-ethnic country, the nation was considered united until the individual ethnicities began to define themselves against the Hungarian nation that was their home, a fact that the Habsburg court initially used in accordance with the 'divide and rule' principle[106], but after the First World War, the monarch fell, and so did we. The country, deprived of its army, was left completely helpless through the fault of the left-wing government. The nationalities living here took advantage of this to ally themselves with the neighbouring peoples of the same mother tongue and thus were able to carve off large areas - densely populated with Hungarians - from this country, which had hitherto united the entire Carpathian Basin and treated it as an organic whole.

Long before the war, in his book of 1912, the intellectual and radically bourgeois, liberal Oszkár Jászi argued in favour of nationalities against the Hungarian nation.[107] After the Gray Rose Revolution (late October 1918), he became a minister without a portfolio in charge of nationality affairs in the left-wing Károlyi government. With varying degrees of success, he offered autonomy and federation to the nationalities, believing that eventually, in time anyway, all borders would blur, nations would disappear - a formation he believed would foment discord - and cultural/scientific and economic exchanges would leave a dominant common language in the United States of Europe.[108] However, this was utopian even then, and in real life, after the fall of the government and the Soviet Republic (communist dictatorship), it was no longer enough for nationalities. They took their chance.

The Hungarians of the territories separated from the motherland by the Trianon peace dictate - you could be one too, if you were born there (!) - clung to their national roots even against all forced resettlement and re-education. Those who could no longer stand the violent "integration" of the "foreigners" into other national identities - for example, into the Romanian nation, or into

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[105] Bálint Csanád mentioned this. In: Kásler 2014, p. 87
[106] Zelnik József mentioned this, In: Kásler 2014, p. 54
[107] Jászi Oszkár (1912): *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* – Társadalomtudományi Könyvtár. Új sorozat; 24. Grill Károly Könyvkiadó vállalata, Budapest, p. 566
[108] Jászi 1912, 533.

the Slavic nationality, and then into the Slovak nation - fled back to the remaining central part of the "Motherland". Unfortunately, Hungary has an increasing number of these types of "migrants", as they have made further development impossible in their homeland.

How could Hungary integrate the "half-blood" children of the abused women, the workers who came here, and in the last century the Hungarians from abroad, the brothers and sisters of the Hungarian nation? The answer is the inherently accepting attitude of the Hungarian people, who never owned slaves, but were often enslaved. Another answer to the Hungarian integrative talent is our generally attractive, permissive culture, our developed, beautiful and self-explanatory language, the genius of our poets, and our emphasis on the ethos of heroism. Strength is attractive to all. Anyone who gets to know Hungarians really, intimately, will align themselves with the Hungarians, even if they have different roots - such as the Poles, who cherish and acknowledge the desire for freedom - because they find a sense of home and happiness in this free-spirited people.

But despite all this, we should not be surprised if the Hungarians do not welcome with sincere affection the descendants of the culture that formerly subjugated them, socialised far away and elsewhere, if they flock to their borders in masses. This is a matter of historical lessons and common sense, not ideology. The fact that someone explains the events of history, the beliefs and concepts that have developed, by dissecting it from one aspect or another - by dissecting the events into an opaque mess and distorting the essence - does not give him the right to expect the same from everyone else, ideologically speaking, and to lose his intersubjective sense of national identity, self-identity and homeliness with others.

In short: Hungary, which is more than 1000 years old, has been crossed through and through by the soldiers of other peoples (Germans, Tatars, Turks, Austrians, Russians, Romanians, "Soviets", etc.), and what is a tragedy in the short term is the genetic diversity of the present-day Hungarian people (the beauty of Hungarian women is perhaps not so subjective), but still, we who live here belong to the same cultural circle. Cultural integrity is not something this small country, which has longed for understanding, but rarely gets help, as we have no kindred peoples in Europe, and each people and nation has its own historical past and problems to deal with. The Hungarians in Hungary are only of interest to foreign economic/political leaders in so far as their own point of view and interests are concerned, and what is the geostrategic location of the Hungarians in terms of warfare, politics and economics. The latter somewhat dissected: what are their qualifications, what are/can they produc/producinging, manufacture/manufacturing, what are their "markets", trade, energy sector, etc. like, i.e. what type of investment - or other solution - what type and how much is the benefit to be gained. Moreover, our national identity is only represented in stereotypes, such as goulash, pálinka and some tourist opportunities, such as the "csikós" on the Hortobágy, Lake Balaton and thermal baths - cultural heritage is only complementary and only of interest to a narrow group of people as a main destination.

This is precisely the indicator of diversity: a simplistic stereotypical knowledge of peoples[109] that emphasises certain characteristics. We must strive for a harmony of diversity - Renan wrote in 1882 - which we can apply to Europe today:

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[109] See about this:: Tózsa István (2020): *Országimázs – a magyar országérték, országmárka mérési*

With their various and often conflicting qualities, nations contribute to the common work of civilisation; each contributes a voice to the great concert of humanity, which is, after all, the highest ideal reality to which we have succeeded in rising. Isolated, each nation has its own weak point. It often occurs to me that a man who had all the defects which are usually regarded as national virtues, that is to say, who was animated only by vain glory, who was of an immensely envious, selfish and quarrelsome nature, who could suffer nothing without immediately striking back - such a man would be utterly intolerable. But all these dissonances of detail dissolve in the ensemble sound.[110]

The fact that the peoples of Europe are not interested in Hungarians, beyond stereotypes, is our everyday experience, both historically and today. Our problem is not stereotyping, but violent ideological uniformisation. Where this people with its trials and tribulations, yet with its glorious past, without relatives in Europe, is drifting to: nobody cares. They will be thrown to anybody, anytime, if geopolitical interests demand it. This is precisely what we would like to avoid nowadays, to 'manage' our own destiny.

7. Motivational aspects and counterparts from the perspective of European national identity

What I will discuss in this short study is the typical European, or more specifically the East-Central European national identity, and more specifically the Hungarian national consciousness in the 21st century, because everybody judges the type of national consciousness he or she represents or rejects according to his or her own spatio-temporal position and history. Universal validity can only be pursued according to a logical table, but everyone fills it with his or her own examples.

National Identity (N.I.) can be interpreted in many different ways, depending on the motivation. Let us mention a few:

1) National Identity in the good sense: the desire for autonomy, freedom and independence (as the ideal of the classical liberal nation-state; conservative characteristic of essentially shared values and solidarity.)

2) A bad sense of national identity: it implies megalomaniac expansionism, based on historical precedents or on an unjustifiably created motive, which entails a harsh foreign policy and war. It is also called nationalism, which we should add to the negative connotation of nationalism.

3) Actual national consciousness: as even elected leaders of the people, despite their often blandishments, actually act. They subordinate everything to their own national interests, since it is the responsibility of elected leaders to live up to their symbolic status and therefore, optimally, to protect their nation more than themselves.

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lehetőségei és nemzetközi esélyei. In: Tózsa István (ed.) Hungarikumok és örökségtervezés. (egyetemi jegyzet) Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem. 2020.

[110] Renan 1995, p 186.; Renan, Ernest. (1995): *Mi a nemzet?* In Bretter, Z. – Deák, Á. (ed.): Eszmék a politikában: a nacionalizmus. Pécs: Tanulmány Kiadó, pp 171–187.
https://adatbank.transindex.ro/html/cim_pdf642.pdf (utolsó letöltés: 27. 04. 2021.)

4) Those who oppose national identity are those who are interested in something else for various reasons. Such reasons may include: ideologies, fanatical religion (even of a distant type), selfishness, money, imperial ambitions, etc.

5) Problematic national identities: where several national identities mix with each other in such a way that no homogeneous identity emerges. For example, in the case of a group or individuals who have failed to integrate. Such is the case when someone's identity, determined by primary external traits, does not match those into which they should integrate and they are unable to culturally transcend this and accept the new situation. This is unfortunately a breeding ground for hostility and bigotry.

Is it even possible to talk about national identity? Who is denying it and why? What is the background to their denial, what are they afraid of, and how can they be persuaded to change their entrenched positions? In short, those who deny it fear the possibility of war for humanity and project the vision of war into everything they do not represent. They deny anything that gives them some kind of inner stability that they think is conservative, because they believe that these are a direct path to some kind of destructive aggression. They do so even if this has no basis in the present, since they formulate their own self-identity precisely in opposition to national identity, and seek self-justification, which they package and disseminate with a cunning and imagination that puts the Rhaetors to shame. Moreover, they manufacture new and new progressive ideologies of terror, to which they believe the only possible response is to break with the past, even to erase what they do not like, even by spreading concrete falsifications of history as an alternative interpretation, a narrative.

The critics of national identity will take the enemy ship into a narrow channel and sink it there if it is not prepared to attack. The best way to take the edge off the superficial and wheeling and dealing critics is to better understand for ourselves the approach from which the shells are coming, and to point out the logical flaws and excesses of the strategy that ultimately leads them to find themselves trapped in their own trap. Hermeneutically, we move beyond parochialism. But before the logical approach, let us mention the neurobiological aspect.

8. What is a superpoly? The discovery of Tamás Freund, the connections between creativity and national identity

The discovery of Tamás Freund opens two paths, which are explained and intellectually resolved by each other. Freund and Tózsa are empirical researchers, but ultimately they draw conclusions from social science. Social science starts out on a so-called transcendental (possibility-conditioned) path and seeks empirical certainty. As Aristotle said: in time, doctors become philosophers and philosophers become doctors. Success depends on the accumulation and synthesis of knowledge. But what exactly are we talking about?

> Three Hungarian neuroscientists have been awarded The Brain Prize and has been awarded 1 million Euros in total in 2011 for their work on the brain's neural networks, which play a key role in memory processes (Copenhagen, 4 March 2011). The prize was shared between Péter Somogyi, Tamás Freund and György Buzsáki for their "wide-ranging research of outstanding theoretical and experimental quality that has revealed the organisation and function of neural networks in the cerebral cortex, in particular the hippocampus, which is

key to learning and memory processes," announced the Grete Lundbeck European Brain Research Foundation in Denmark. All three researchers were born in Hungary, two of them live abroad - in Europe and the United States - but all three scientists are interested in the way neuronal networks process information in the brain. Although all three Hungarian researchers focus their scientific work on understanding basic brain processes, their research has led to a better understanding of the causes and symptoms of a range of diseases and disorders, from epilepsy to Parkinson's disease, anxiety and senile dementia. These researches, which link structure and function from the molecular level to behaviour, has become a reference in the field.[111]

The work of Tamás Freund [...] focuses on so-called inhibitory neurons, whose signalling substance is gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA). By releasing it, they reduce the activity of the cells they innervate and coordinate their function. Tamás Freund and colleagues have identified three of these new neuron types in the hippocampus, which are linked to other inhibitory neurons. Of outstanding importance is their discovery that the function of inhibitory cells can be synchronised rhythmically by inhibition, using pacemaker cells. The latter has led to an understanding of how cortical wave activity, essential for memory processes, develops. It has also been experimentally demonstrated that so-called cannabis-like molecules, which are naturally found as signal transducers in the brain and in some drugs that affect brain function, act on a specific group of inhibitory neurons, and that a defect in the functioning of this regulatory system can be the source of many neurological and psychiatric disorders.[112]

Tamás Freund (currently the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) gave a lecture at TedxDanubia in 2011 entitled Brainwaves and Creativity.[113] He claimed that each of our 100 billion brain cells has 40-60 thousand connections with other nerve cells. Around 10,000 of these nerve cells are needed for the creation, synchronisation and firing of a memory unit. These synchronisations are performed by inhibitory cell "polyps", which are also controlled by other superpolyps, but from under the unicortex, from the ancient emotional areas.

The essence of his insight is this:

> [...] the neuronal network activity patterns associated with the two phases of memory processes, the theta and gamma oscillations and the neuronal network basis for the generation of sharp-wave activity. There are billions of neurons in the human cerebral cortex. Each of them is connected to more than forty to sixty thousand others, giving them impulses as well as receiving impulses from them. The strength of the points of connections vary. They can become stronger or weaker depending on their use. Everything that has ever happened to us has left a permanent imprint on our brain. It's not the writing or the imprinting that's the problem, it's the recall. If fear or a positive emotion or motivation is linked to a particular event, we can easily recall it, and we know the mechanisms of this relatively well. We know which areas of the brain deliver impulses about emotions, motivation, even fear responses, and we also know that these ancient pathways maintain neuronal activity that facilitates the imprinting of memory traces. Patterns of neuronal activity, brain waves, are used to synchronize the activity of the neurons involved in encoding; when these encoding neurons discharge at the same time, they are able to strengthen their connections with each other, and this is where memory is stored. Emotion is the key moment. These brain waves will have a higher frequency or higher amplitude if we have a rich inner world. If we want anything to be permanently stored in our brains, we need to allow time for the pathways that carry our emotions and motivations to generate

[111] https://web.archive.org/web/20150610035816/http://www.thebrainprize.org/files/4/the_brain_prize_2011_hungarian.pdf (downloaded: 03.10.2021.)
[112] https://web.archive.org/web/20150610035816/http://www.thebrainprize.org/files/4/the_brain_prize_2011_hungarian.pdf (downloaded: 03.10.2021.)
[113] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ug2OIErll8 (downloaded: 03.10.2021.)

this wave activity. In order for the stored knowledge to be easily recalled, to improve our ability to associate, we need to coat these information bricks with the mortar of our inner world. The richer the inner world, the thicker the mortar on the bricks, the broader the associations. This inner world is unique, and everyone's upbringing, the experiences they have had in school, their art education, their active cultivation of the arts, determine its richness and make it unique. Therefore, the creative person is the one who, from the information available to everyone, comes up with something quite different from the average person.[114]

According to István Tózsa, the important question is: "what is creativity? What does it have to do with patriotism, national identity and national values?"[115] [...] Tózsa writes the following about Tamás Freund (2020):

> Creative thinking requires a lot of stored memory. There's no mistake about it, everyone's brain stores a lot of memory units, a network connected by reinforced synapses. As we said, it is the recall of these that is the problem. What is it that pacemakers use to decide what to pay attention to, when and why, what to remember, when and why? It is the so-called internal emotional world of the individual, which assigns its impulses to external environmental information packets in the process of storing them. This makes them easy to recall. According to neurobiological research, the effectiveness of our inner world depends on four outline factors:
>
> 1. *motivation* (individual sensitivity and interest orientations),
> 2. *emotional richness,*
> 3. *cultural, traditional knowledge and sense of geographical identity,*
> 4. *difficulty in obtaining information.*[116]

To sum up, Tózsa writes:

> The alpha and omega of creativity is to have a rich inner emotional world. Then - and only then - will the pacemaker cells in the cerebral cortex and subconscious mind be fired to their peak. This will allow them to select from the millions of pieces of information they perceive, through highly efficient signal transmissions, and store in a retrievable way the memory units (building blocks) that are useful for creativity.
> What do you need in practice?
>
> 1. *Enriching the emotions* from a young age, through cathartic (artistic) experiences: arts education, drama, performing arts, visual arts, literature, history, cinema, in all their volumes.
> 2. *Active participation* is very important. Confucius' teaching is well known: "*tell me and I'll forget it; show me and I'll remember it; let me do it and I'll understand it.*" The cathartic experience in the arts is literally multiplied when young people are involved in the production and performance of artistic value. It is no coincidence that George Bernard Shaw is quoted as stressing the importance of play, including adult play ("We do not forget to play because we grow old, we grow old because we forget to play.")
> 3. The *teaching of educational values*, history, literature, geography and the *ethics* and *morals* which are connected to the *national identity*, is also of great importance,
> 4. in addition to, or in spite of, the Internet, it is very important to maintain and re-establish *small living communities*. In particular, the richness of emotions, which enhances creativity, is increased when national value *creation* and creativity, or education, take place

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[114] https://www.zaol.hu/hetvege/az-agykutato-nobel-dija-1405677/ (downloaded: 03.10.2021.)
[115] Tózsa 2020, p. 253
[116] Same, p. 254

in small communities. Such small communities include choirs, orchestras, folk dance, drama, clubs, sports, scouting, film clubs, joint innovation activities.

Is patriotism, the emotional expression of a sense of geographical identity, linked to creativity? Today's globalised societies, experiencing a social environment that has changed with the information explosion, are most creative where *emotionally enriching, cathartic artistic experiences are taught in small interactive creative communities*. Where can such primary and secondary education be found? It is a difficult - if not impossible - task to compare national curricula for primary and secondary education in different countries and provinces. It is simpler to look at the impact of education, which is best measured in terms of innovative economic, artistic, sporting and scientific achievements. These can be geographically localised, measured and compared, and reflect the effectiveness of education - creativity, geographical differences. This has put Hungarians - despite being a small nation of ten million people - at the top of the world in many fields. It would be a shame to lose this in the 21st century.[117]

I would also say that experiential geography - that is, school and family and community excursions - is needed to learn about Hungarian regions, but also about gastronomy, folk costumes, folk songs and the main areas of ethnography. From this point of view, folk culture is an important complement to national culture, and folklore, with its many uses, can revitalise the national feeling, integrating it into the high culture, making our historical, literary and artistic memories authentic (on this, see Gábor Barna: *Folk culture - national culture - national identity[118]*). All this and much more makes the world of Hungarikums our pride and joy. However, in addition to preserving the past and reviving traditions, the creativity, innovation and sustainable thinking of future generations are of paramount importance in our fast-paced world.[119]

Kant discussed creativity in the context of genius aesthetics in his third critique, *The Critique of Judgement*.[120]

§ 46 Fine art is the art of genius
Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives art its rule. And since talent itself, as the innate productive ability of the artist, belongs to nature, we might say that genius is the ingenium of the mind by which nature gives the rule to art. Whatever the case may be with this definition, whether it be merely arbitrary or whether it corresponds to the concept usually associated with the word genius [...], we can prove in advance that, according to the meaning of the word as here taken as a basis, all fine art must necessarily be considered the art of genius.

For all art presupposes rules which are the indispensable basis for a work of art to be presented as possible. The concept of fine art, however, does not allow a judgement on the beauty of a work to be derived from a rule for which a concept is the determining basis, that is to say, for the judgement to be based on a concept of how the work is possible. Fine art cannot, therefore, invent for itself the rule according to which it must produce its work.

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[117] Tózsa 2020, pp 258-260

[118] Barna Gábor (2011): *Népi kultúra – nemzeti kultúra – nemzeti identitás.* In Jankovics József – Nyerges Judit (ed.): Kultúra és identitás. A VI. Nemzetközi Hungarológiai Kongresszus plenáris előadásai. Debrecen, 222-26 August 2006. Nemzetközi Magyarságtudományi Társaság, Budapest. 61–85.
https://mek.oszk.hu/09300/09396/html/01.htm (Downloaded: 11-12-2021)

[119] On this, see: Tózsa István: *Innovation and Identity*. Civic Review, Vol. 15, Special Issue, 2019, 385–392, DOI: 10.24307/psz.2020.0223

[120] Kant, Immanuel (1790): *Az ítélőerő kritikája.* (trans. Papp Zoltán) Budapest, Ictus, 1997.

But, because without a prior rule a work of art can never be called art, it is the nature of the subject that must give the rule to art, namely by the attunement of the faculties of the subject; that is to say, art is possible only as the work of genius.

Four things become apparent from this:
(1) Genius: talent for creating something for which no definite rule can be given, not the ability belonging to skill for what can be learned according to some rule; consequently, the first quality of genius must be originality.
(2) Since, however, there can be original nonsense, the genius's creation must also be a model, that is, an example; that is, the creation, which cannot itself be born of imitation, must nevertheless be worthy of imitation in the eyes of others, that is, it must serve as a standard or rule of judgment.
(3) The genius cannot himself describe or show scientifically how he has produced his work, but as nature gives the rule; and therefore he who owes his work to his genius does not himself know how the ideas necessary for it arise in him, nor is it in his power to conceive such ideas either at will or by design, and to share them in such prescriptions as would enable others to produce works like his. (This is presumably the world is genius, by which is meant nothing else than that peculiar spirit, which guides and protects man from birth, and from which original ideas are born.)
(4) Nature does not give rules to science through the genius, but to art, and even then just that, that it should be fine art.

§ 48 *On the relation of genius to taste*
To judge beautiful objects by their beauty requires taste, but for fine art itself, that is, for the creation of beautiful objects, genius is required.

As we have seen, the scientific approach traces creativity back to the activity balance of the neural network, which has emotional motivations, and emotions are also essential for self-identity, and rely on the quality and strength of, for example, national identity (Freund and Tózsa). Kant, on the other hand, emphasises creative rule-making in his transcendental philosophy. I will draw on both to construct my logic board, but for now I will start with the philosophical grounding.

9. Preparing the philosophical foundations of national identity

9.1. National identity as an emergent phenomenon

The question of national identity and consciousness is discussed as an emergent phenomenon,[121] not as a preconceived statement of it, guided by mere preconceptions. The problems of emergence and attribution within philosophy have been very much intensified for the 21st century. Is it our consciousness that objectifies the entities that appear and makes them appear to us as they are, or are they given to us 'behind the back' of consciousness, unintentionally? The first assumes that consciousness is directed intensionally towards something - 'bringing something to light' - which then becomes what we would normally expect

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[121] Not in terms of the phenomenology of philosophy, but still as a phenomenon, former political and military intelligence officer Hugh Seton-Watson discusses national identity: "Thus I am driven to the conclusion that no 'scientific definition' of the nation can be devised: yet the phenomenon has existed and exists." (Hugh Seton-Watson, George: Nations and States - An Enquiry Into The Origins Of Nations And The Politics Of Nationalism. Methuen, 1977. p. 5) cited in Anderson 1983/1991, p. 3. Although the historical aspect cannot be ignored, we would like to provide a guideline for this statement at the end of our paper, with the help of our logic table.

it to be, while the second approach is to let the phenomena give itself freely and new, previously unknown qualities to proliferate, to emerge. The former is a Kantian approach, developed by Husserl, while the latter is the Marion way, followed by Henry.

It is important to mention this because the problem with critics of national identity is precisely that they start from a pre-conception of a condemnatory preconception and try to move within this architectonicity and involve others rather than starting from the self-giving nature of the phenomenon under investigation. This was precisely the problem of the 20th century French phenomenologists with the too narrow Kantian philosophy, or rather with its first major critique, the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). Thus, they (Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Marion, Henry, Richir) later trued to create a new draft of the phylosophical world which was based on the Critique of Judgement (CJ). These attempts were summarised and developed by the Hungarian László Tengelyi, who tought to address the original, rather passive and self-giving, appearance of the original.

The philosophical doctrine, ripe for the 21st century, is to have no preconceptions about the phenomenon under study, but to allow oneself to be surprised by it. We should not pre-channel our interpretation of experience, which weakens the phenomenon itself, but rather examine it from as many angles as possible, and it is this multifaceted examination that will allow us to uncover hitherto hidden meanings. Thus, the yield of contemporary phenomenological philosophy is an experience of openness and novelty.

It would be somewhat paradoxical, therefore, if someone who considers himself a successor to this free-thinking tradition were to use a preconception of a phenomenology; that is, to abandon his philosophical principles in favour of his political opinion and thus become a sophist, a denouncer of Socrates, like those who have condemned Plato and the friends of wisdom to a lifetime of despair.

9.2. Registers of consciousness

First of all, it is worth clarifying what "consciousness" means as a concept, what it expresses, what and how it represents. Since philosophy, at least in phenomenology, starts from the experience of consciousness,[122] it can be divided according to the tendencies that investigate the existence and orientations of consciousness.[123] In my view, there are basically three different ways of looking at the world and ourselves. These allow for different qualities of explanations of the world, and therefore these three perspectives can be treated as separate registers. Tabularly, I refer to three columns as registers. The register of sense is understood, the register of bodily perception is felt, and the register of feelings and emotions is experienced - but all of this is mentioned in the context of an expanded theory of consciousness.[124] So the registers of consciousness are:

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[122] As a complementary point, we are now approaching this thesis from a fundamentally phenomenological point of view, and we do not wish to enter into a critique of this starting point, but rather to make some observations. Tengelyi, for example, praises Sartre's philosophical starting point for this primordial statement - that is, the existence of consciousness. (see Tengelyi 2011, p. 55)

[123] Even contemporary psychology shares this approach. "One's perceptions, thoughts and feelings at a given moment make up one's consciousness." Atkinson 2003, p. 194 The typological proposal discussed below therefore has interdisciplinary validity in this respect.

[124] In relation to consciousness, the term "philosophy of mind" is generally applied to all theories that base their philosophy on, for example, rational thought and mind (Descartes), the critique of pure reason (Kant), or the formation of meaning (Husserl). However, we refer to these as theories of the 'intellectual register', since we

Table 2: Registers of consciousness: sense-perception-feeling

The registers of consciousness		
Sense (1.)	Physical perception (2.)	Feelings/Emotions (3.)

<div align="right">Source: own editing</div>

Column 1 always asks, "What is the sense of something?", column 2 asks, "What is our bodily perception of something?", and column 3 asks, "What is the feeling of life as appearance?"

Using another, freer division, that is, expressed in terms more loosely than strict philosophical terms, the essence of each column makes the following appeal to us: column 1 instructs us to "Understand with your mind", column 2 instructs us to "Live with your body", and column 3 instructs us to "See with your heart". The latter is what Pascal calls the order of the heart (*ordre du coeur*), the logic of the heart (*logique du coeur*),[125] and Scheler speaks of the order of love (*ordo amoris*).[126]

It is worth identifying certain additional features that may facilitate the explanation of these three perspectives. For example, if you are sitting in a nightclub talking with friends and someone asks you what you consider to be reality, you will give a different answer in terms of each aspect, perspective, register.

(1.) From the point of view of the intellectual register, if we look around, we see tables, chairs, glasses, that is, things, objects, people, everything in its own number of pieces, which we can account for in meaningful contexts.

(2.) In terms of the bodily register, we tend to concentrate on our bodily desires and senses, i.e. we stare at an aesthetically attractive individual, we savour our drink. We then see attractive and unattractive people, and notice delicious drinks, as if their taste is already tempting our mouths.

(3.) And in terms of the emotional register, we focus on our self-affective attunement and our atmospheric feelings, and we also perceive the feelings and emotions of others.

In our view, these three aspects are three ways of seeing, of looking at, of experiencing the world, and at the same time, they are a way of speaking, a philosophical possibility.[127]

9.3 The critical perspective of the philosophy of Kant, Czétány and the 3 registers

The starting point is Kant, who built his philosophy on reason, critically questioning all previous metaphysics. He considered the three main ideas of reason - Self, World, God - to be illusions,

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leave the concept of 'consciousness' to a broader conception which, beyond the intellectual register mentioned, includes aspects of the corporeal and emotional register.

[125] Boros 2014, p. 161

[126] Same, p. 144

[127] Müller Andor (2016): A filozófia tipológiája és az érzelemképződés filozófiája (Downloaded: 13-01-2021) http://nagyalma.hu/container/volume/2016/161.01_MA_1-27p.pdf

but these are merely guiding principles that organise thought according to different syntheses. Thus, for Kant, mind, unlike reason, does not do the work of determining judgment (schematizing concepts and perspectives), but gives direction to thought. Czétány (2019) summarizes in his book *A nagy narratívák összecsapása – Három szintézis harca egy konzisztens valóságért (The Clash of the Great Narratives - Three Syntheses in the Struggle for a Consistent Reality)*:

> What does Kant mean by reason? Kant distinguishes between sense and reason. Sense subordinates the sensory diversity of perception to concepts. Since sense is not able to organise its operations on the basis of principles beyond its own empirical concepts, it is the task of reason to regulate the coherence of cognition in a unifying way on the basis of some principle. For this purpose, reason needs unconditional concepts, transcendental ideas, as regulative principles of experience. An unconditional concept is a synthetic unity of a set of conditions.[128] How are the unconditional concepts and ideas of reason formed? Reason's basic mode of operation is conclusions, that is, the deductive acquisition of knowledge from principles.[129] In deduction, we form some kind of relation between conditionals. In transcendental analytics (in the context of judgments of the mind), we encounter three notions of relation: "Any relation of reasoning in judgments is either (a) the relation of the predicate to the subject, or (b) the relation of the ground to the consequence, or (c) the relation of the knowledge divided and of all the parts obtained by division to each other."[130] The three modes of conclusions can be defined on this basis as follows.
>
> A categorical conclusion is the relation of two concepts to each other, the assignment of a predicate to a subject (e.g. "Caius is mortal"). The logical principle of this is the contradiction theorem, according to which contradictory predicates cannot refer to the same subject in the same respect. The synthetic unit of categorical conclusions is the subject itself.
>
> The hypothetical conclusion is the relation of two judgments as a consequence of each other. For example: 'If there is perfect justice, then the incorrigible evil-doer will be punished'. Its logical principle is the sufficient basis theorem, i.e. that every just judgment must have a sufficient basis. The synthetic unity of hypothetical conclusions is a complete set of mutually justifying conditions.
>
> A disjunctive conclusion is the relation of two or more judgments to each other as a logical opposition, where the domain of one judgment excludes that of the other. Together, however, they fill out the domain of actual knowledge (i.e., they are in a relation of reciprocity). For example, "The world exists either by blind chance, or by internal necessity, or by the use of some external cause." Its logical principle is the third principle of exclusion, that everything must either be asserted or denied. The synthetic unity of disjunctive conclusions is the totality of disjunctive determinations.
>
> Transcendental ideas are directed to the unconditional synthetic unity of all conditions.[131]

Kant wrote about the connection between the three kinds of relative judgments (categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive) and the principles of logic (the principle of contradiction, the

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[128] Kant, Immanuel (1781/2004): *A tiszta ész kritikája*. (Trans. Kis János), Atlantisz, Budapest, 318.
[129] Quoted work, 302.
[130] Quoted work, 121.
[131] Czétány 2019, pp 53

principle of sufficient ground and the principle of the excluded third) in a letter to Reinhold dated 19 May 1789.[132]

With regard to Kantian ideas of reason, Czétány considers the 'I' to be the bundle that collects and categorises phenomena, the world to correspond to new events, and God to order. In terms of their logic: 'and', 'if-then', 'or'. In their temporal structure: present, future, past. Pure concepts or transcendental ideas are directed to the unconditional synthetic unity of all conditions. On this basis, the three types of transcendental ideas are as follows:

1. the unconditional entity performing the *categorical and conjunctive synthesis*, the subject without predicate, the Self;
2. *the hypothetical and connective synthesis* of the conditional members of a set, the unconditional unit of the set of phenomena, the World;
3. *the disjunctive synthesis* of the elements of a system, the unconditional unity of all possible objects of thought, God.[133]

Later, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant formulates this as follows, referring to their illusory but undeniable transcendental existence:

> These are not the delusions of men, but of pure reason itself. Even the wisest man cannot get rid of them, and even if he may, with much effort, expose the error, he can never entirely dispel the illusion which incessantly torments him.
>
> There are thus only three kinds of dialectical syllogisms, as many as the ideas they contain in their conclusion. In the *first* case, I infer from the transcendental notion of a subject without any diversity that this subject itself, of which I do not gain any conception in this way, is absolutely unified. I call this dialectical inference transcendental *paralogism*. The *second* class of misapprehensions of reason concerns the transcendental notion of the absolute totality of the series of conditions of any given phenomenon; here I proceed from the assumption that the notion of the absolute synthetic unity of the series is one-sided, always contradictory to itself, from which I infer the truth of the unity which is contrary to it, although I cannot form any notion of this either. The state into which reason enters in the course of such dialectical deductions I call the *antinomy* of pure reason. Finally, in the case of the *third* kind of reason-induced delusion, I infer from the totality of the objects and conditions which I can conceive of at all the absolute, synthetic unity of the totality of the conditions which underlie the existence of things as things at all, that is to say, I start from things which I do not know by their mere transcendental conception, and from this I infer some supreme being which I know even less by its transcendental conception, and of whose absolutely necessary being I am unable to form a conception. I call this dialectical syllogism the *ideal* of pure reason.[134]

In CPR (1781: *Critique of Pure Reason*) Kant formulates the logical possibilities in several ways:

'As many relations as there are of which reason forms a conception by means of categories, so many pure concepts of reason will exist. In other words, we must *first* find the *uncondition* which gives rise to a *categorical* synthesis in a *subject*, *secondly*, that which is necessary for the *hypothetical* synthesis

[132] Kant 1972, 391.
[133] See more., Kant 1781/2004, CPR, 325-326. Quoted: Czétány 2015, p. 35
[134] Kant 1781/2004, pp. 329 (*B 397-398*)

of the members of a *set*, and *thirdly*, that which is necessary for the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts of a *system*.[135]

Czétány distinguishes between an excessively one-sided constitutive and a proportionate regulative use of reason.

> If transcendental ideas appear as constitutive ideas of the totality of conditions, they turn out to be transcendental ideas. But it is only the use of ideas that transcends all possible experience, not the ideas themselves. Ideas are therefore illusions by virtue of this use.[136] [137]

The ideas of reason, according to Czétány, struggle for primacy in the problematic unity of reality in all fields and, as we have formulated it, he has worked out a *logic of reference* covering almost every detail and segment: social ages, philosophical history, politics, literature, art, painting, music, biology, etc. This is how he puts it in his first book (Czétány 2015): *A transzcendentális illúzió keletkezése és története – Három szintézis harca egy egységes valóságért (The Origin and History of the Transcendental Illusion - Three Syntheses in the Struggle for a Unified Reality)*:

> The synthesis of chaos is an order, a perspective and an event. Thus, together. The synthesis of chaos is a divine order, a perspective of a *subject* and the event of the *world*. Each synthesis synthesizes the *whole* of reality, yet in a different way. The syntheses strive to create a consistent unity of reality by clashing with each other, cooperating and fighting with each other to constitute out of chaos what is. The Absolute is the cooperation and struggle of God, the Self and the World to shape reality. The Absolute: three syntheses.

> Following Deleuze, we can call the three constitutive syntheses *disjunctive, conjunctive* and *connective* synthesis; that is, separative, referential and connective synthesis. This brings us at once to the three Kantian transcendental ideas: God is the disjunctive synthesis of possible predicates, the Self is the conjunctive synthesis of images, the World is the connective synthesis of empirical conditions.[138] But with Kant, the immanent use of syntheses is merely regulative, while their transcendental use is what is constitutive. In the present case, on the contrary, it is the immanent constitutive use of these syntheses that is at issue: syntheses are syntheses that constitute reality, that create it, and syntheses that constitute reality immanently, that are contained in it. None of these syntheses transcend reality. It is the synthesis that makes the inconsistent multitude into a consistent unity, that gives consistency to inconsistency. But there are three syntheses, which make it impossible for any one of them to become a total synthesis and form an absolute consistent unity, a unity that transcends the multitude.[139]

Compared to this theory (3 Synthesis - "3S"), the philosophy of the 3 registers (sense-perception-feeling) differs in several striking points:

1. the metaphysics of ability of the philosophy of the 3 registers in order to explain Reality does not take as its starting point the sequential syntheses of God, Self, World, as

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[135] Kant 2014, p. 318 CPR *B 379-380.*
[136] Quoted work, 516-517
[137] Czétány 2019, pp 53-54
[138] Kant 1781/2004, pp. 325-326
[139] Czétány 2015, p. 14

Czétány,[140] who represents the philosophy of the '3S', but the sequentiality of Self, World, God, and does not explain this by historical reasons, but according to the self-reflexive-critical starting point of the conclusion, which is turned around at the end, and from then on it is a question of the terrain of God making the appearance of the other terrains possible in the first place.

2. The whole of the trinity is not a struggle for us, but rather a harmony, but of course the struggle is undeniable (Husserl spoke of harmony and disharmony)[141]. Furthermore, the proclamation of struggle or the pursuit of harmony is a self-fulfilling prophecy of the whole, of the "karma" of the theory, for, one might say, in a truism: "What you eat, you become!" - in the intellectual sense too.

3. The philosophy of the 3 registers places particular emphasis on the way in which the terrains are related to each other (diacritics, Borromeo knot, homiomereia, etc.), treating them not only as separate ideas of reason, transcendental ideas, and establishing differences of intensity between the terrains, but also inquiring into the concrete internal and inter-related organization of each terrain.

4. According to the 3 registers, the most fundamental "building blocks" of syntheses are the capacities of each synthesis/terrene (sense, perception, emotion).

5. There is a struggle and a search for harmony not only between the terrains (syntheses) but also within them between the sense-perception-emotion-intensities. For there is an interplay-like continuum (duration) between the faculties, and the logic of their unity is similar to that of diacritics.

6. According to the metaphysics of ability in the philosophy of the 3 registers, the relationship between the same type of abilities in the different terrains is the one that makes possible the relationship between the terrains, which can be examined according to the following: transmission, chiasmus, intensionality, representation, correlation, self-reflection, etc., all according to the effect of the ability of one terrain on the others or on itself.

7. In the philosophy of the 3 registers, the importance of duration and situational transmission is paramount: separately in relation to the registers of faculties (sense, perception, emotion) of each of the primordial beings (God, World, Self), but even more so between the registers of faculties of the different primordial beings. All these interrelations are animated by the eternal nature of the "how" of the three faculties (logos, chiasmus, self-affection/self-feeling), which "break through" the present, appearing according to their ideality.

8. Reality is, according to the philosophy of the 3 registers (sense-perception-feeling), the 3 terrains and all the possibilities of their relations, given situationally in their common duration. To sum up, the most important difference is that the capability-metaphysics of the philosophy of the 3 registers does not rely on the sequential syntheses of God, Self, World to explain Reality, but even more fundamental is the trinity of the building blocks of sense-perception-feeling, which build the 3 syntheses (3S) separately, but treating them as terrenals, in a different way (from personality traits to ideals).

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[140] Lately, Czétany has been emphasizing pluriconsistency, i.e. the constant cooperation of the three syntheses - in terms of the study of anything - and the changing patterns of forces (hopefully, among other things, in our common discussions), thus eclipsing its earlier idea of the emergence of almost pure syntheses in historical times.

[141] Husserl writes in The Depression, §48: "The self-giving of any being, concrete or abstract, real or ideal, has its own ways: on the side of the self, the ways of intention in the ways of validity, and correspondingly, the subjective ways of change of the same, in the syntheses of individual-subjective and intersubjective harmony and disharmony." Husserl 1998, 209.

9.4. Philosophy and politics

According to Czétány, the 3 syntheses correspond to the 3 main political ideologies: 'God': disjunctive synthesis - conservatism (Edmund Burke); the 'I': connective synthesis - liberalism (Benjamin Constant), the 'World': connective synthesis[142] - socialism (Karl Marx).

> For conservative thought, the synthesis takes place on a theological-mystical plane, or the plane of the Earth; for liberal thought, on the plane of natural law and property relations; and finally, for socialist thought, on the plane of the economy, or relations of production. Furthermore, the different social syntheses place the emphasis on different aspects of time. For conservative thought, the criterion of the separating synthesis is the historical past, for liberal thought it is the synthesis of the present, of the present will in relation to itself, while for socialist thought it is the synthesis of the interconnected relations of production of the future that gives meaning to the course of history.[143] Each of these syntheses presents one aspect of social relations and of thinking about them, to the exclusion of the other aspects.[144]

According to this division, national identity and its conscious representation: national consciousness, should be classified as old-fashioned conservatism. Czétány writes about Burke and quotes him:

> [...] in his *Reflections on the French Revolution* [...] for Burke, the constitutive, value-giving idea of society is a disjunctive synthesis of the order based on nature.[145]

> [Burke:] Every society is composed of different orders of citizens, and some of these must occupy the highest place. The egalitarians, therefore, only transform and distort the natural order of things. [...] He [the barber or candlemaker] must not suffer oppression from the state; but the state suffers oppression when it permits such to govern either individually or collectively.[146]

> It is by a constitutional policy, working on the example of nature, that we gain, retain, and inherit our government and privileges, in the same manner as we enjoy and hand down our property and life. In the same way, and according to the same order, political institutions, material goods, and the gifts of Providence, are and will be handed down to and from us. Our political system corresponds exactly to the order of the world, is in symmetry with it [...].[147]

> [...] "We have chosen our nature instead of our speculations, our emotions instead of our conjectures, for the preservation and defence of our rights and privileges."[148]
> [Czétány thus says:] The law of nature is speculation[149], not a law derived from real nature. It is not rights but privileges that are derived from nature. "No name, no power, no function,

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[142] For a contemporary discussion on this in connection with globalism, see Hardt, Michael - Negri, Antonio (2000). Harvard University Press, Cambridge / London.

[143] One could say that the three great narratives are in contact with transcendence in different temporalities: conservatism in the past beyond time (divine creation), liberalism in the present beyond time (free choice of the subject), and communism in the future beyond time (resolution of the contradiction of the social production process).

[144] Czétány 2019, p. 58

[145] Czétány 2019, p. 59

[146] Quoted work, 135

[147] Quoted work, 118

[148] Quoted work, 119

[149] Here Czétány mentions natural law as the starting point of liberalism, which Burke's conservatism opposes.

no artificial institution can shape those who are part of a system of power into anything other than what God, nature, education and custom have made them."[150] We must therefore assume a predestined harmony between nature and inherited, surviving customs. In time, the constitution of a well-functioning society will become the inescapable basis of its legitimacy, because it is in harmony with nature. If it were not in harmony, it would not have survived, i.e. its enduring historical existence is proof of the harmony between society and nature. Therefore, it is both a social and a natural law, and whoever violates it is not only breaking the legitimate sovereign, but also breaking nature. For there is, besides the social contract, a natural contract, or rather 'the great primordial contract of eternal society', of which 'each contract of each state is but a single article', and which [according to Burke] binds together the low and the high, the visible and the invisible world, by a firm agreement sanctioned by an unbreakable oath, which holds all physical and moral substances in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those who are impelled by an obligation from a source infinitely higher than themselves to submit their will to it. [...] if that which cannot be but submission to necessity becomes a matter of choice, then transgression, disobedience to nature, and rebellion, are outlawed, expelled from the world of reason, order, peace, and virtue, from the world of effective repentance, into the opposite world of madness, strife, sin, confusion, and vain sorrow.[151]

[Czétány:] The unconditional idea of disjunctive synthesis is God. There is a constant oscillation of thought between the notion of a particular but enduring social law and the notion of a universal, eternal natural law, whereby the human and therefore fallible justification of experience and reason is given an infallible divine underpinning - a metaphysical foundation. This tension arises from the transcendent, totalizing use of disjunctive synthesis as social synthesis. We might call this the transcendental illusion of the grand narrative striving for consistency.[152]

However, I argue that the definition of national identity cannot be reduced to disjunctive synthesis, i.e. narrowly interpreted conservatism (birthrights and privileges due to excellence and descent, which are determined according to divine order). This is, of course, unacceptable these days - those who are excluded have proven many times that they are no different.

National identity has something to say in terms of "I" and "World", and it is not the same as outdated feudal conservatism from the point of view of "God". This means that national identity and its conscious representation, national self-consciousness, have something to say in terms of the "I" and the "World: intersubjectivity, nature, things, history" and cannot be reduced to the idea of "God", the primordial being (Husserl's name on the Kantian ideas/ideas of reason, which he reworked slightly). Moreover, according to the Kantian idea/idea of reason of "God", we do not consider the separation characteristic of the feudal system to be primary, which Western societies attribute to national identity according to the separation (disjunctive) synthesis.

Western thinking does not understand the Hungarians' sense of unity based on an ancient blood pact, since the actual development of national identity in the West can be traced back to the times of colonization and was formulated as the relationship of the colonizers to their subjects (Stoler 1995, 1997). This explains, among other things, why national identity is evaluated and interpreted as a certain distance, difference, distinction - "other" (see: Müller 2021), distinction, separating, i.e. disjunctive synthesis, or in old terms: conservatism, although it would be more correct for them to refer to themselves as globalization self-awareness. Takács writes (2009, 25.):

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[150] Quoted work, 120
[151] Quoted work, 190
[152] Czétány 2019, p. 60

Ann Laura Stoler undertook a biopolitical interpretation of certain characteristics of Western European national development.[153] However, Stoler's approach is unconventional. The main claim of his work is that by failing to examine the colonial scenes and the colonial way of thinking, Foucault ignored one of the main sources of the biopolitical orientation that became dominant in Western Europe in the 19th century. In order to correct this, Stoler not only undertakes to confront the claims of the first volume of A History of Sexuality with the colonial experience of the body in the 18th and 19th centuries, and examines its impact on the development of the European perception of sexuality.[154] At least as important is the presentation of the role this experience played in the development of a characteristically imperial and ethnically based Western biopolitical self-consciousness, which lived on as an integral part of the national and citizen identity of the great colonial powers.[155] Stoler mainly uses Dutch, French and British examples to show how the awareness of the difference between the colonizers and the colonized in these states - in which the factors of physicality, sexuality and hygiene played a fundamental role - led to the birth of a simultaneously imperial, ethnic and national sense of identity. However, the biopolitical approach that typically grew out of the colonial experience gradually created an opportunity for the "internal borders" of individual European national communities to be drawn, thus contributing to the birth of certain modern forms of social exclusion and the development of criteria for national and citizenship status.[156] Ultimately, along this axis, Stoler tries to connect the birth of modern Western European nationalisms with the development of their characteristic ethnic approach.[157]

That is why it is unfair if they want to sweep the innocent Hungarian "concept of nation" as identity and self-awareness under the carpet as something that is not understood, something that does not need to be dealt with.

In addition, the recognition of the concept of the Western nation in relation to colonialism and the II. its fusion with World War II German Nazism (as with the conquests of the "living space" of the racist ideology) made the concept of the "nation" and, in general, all the attributes, qualities, and values related to it, backward and even repudiable for Western thinking.

Just think of the "woke" ideology - so it's no wonder that they show complete incomprehension and lack of understanding regarding the non-colonizing Hungarian nation concept, if they only know their own history and its critical approach, and can't imagine anything else. However, they apply their own historical criticism schemes to everyone else without examining the issue of responsibility. This review suffers a hiatus. The Hungarians are specifically treated by the woke people as if they were former African slaveholders - let's add: completely wrong.

In a general sense, we should also note that national identity and self-awareness in today's West are either considered an invented entity, a fiction (cf. Anderson 1983/1994: *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.*), or an unimaginative tradition, however, we show that, according to the aspects of Kantian ideals/ideas of reason, a re-founded concept of nation can be fruitful, which is not the same as re-enacting the shadows of old ages. This is possible if the most beautiful traditional elements are dynamized and updated in a contemporary way.

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[153] Stoler 1995.
[154] Stoler 1995: 6–7.
[155] Stoler 1995: 7–8.
[156] Stoler 1995: 11. Lásd még ehhez Stoler 1997.
[157] https://adoc.pub/biopolitika-es-nemzeti-allapot-egy-foucault-i-problematika.html (Letöltés: 2021-12-21)

Furthermore, every mind/idea - or renamed in our evening: "terrain" - has three first-impression-type abilities (3É: intellect-perception-emotion).

In relation to contemporary concepts of synthesis, Czétány also examined other writings which, compared to the previous ones, are the "heirs of the political tradition":

> Fukuyama is obviously a continuation of the liberalism concept formulated by Hobbes and Locke and then deepened by Hegel, Huntington refers to Burke's conservatism, and Hardt and Negri rethink Marx's idea of communism. (Czétány 2019, 35.)

We will not discuss these in detail now. In the following, we strictly examine only the aspects of national identity and self-consciousness.

10. Applying the philosophical foundations of national identity

10.1 The architectonics of the philosophical "background"

1st Figure: three capacities in the three terreneums

10.2. Logic table

The Kantian trinity of "Self-World-God" I will slightly rename and supplement, since the concept of "I" can give rise to many misunderstandings nowadays (narcissism, selfishness, egoism), and "World" as an intermediate terrain carries with it a variety of relations, such as relations to intersubjectivity, nature, things and history. And consciousness is made up of three factors, according to our three capabilities - snese, perception, emotion - so in each of these terrains they will help us to elaborate.

3rd Table: The logical table

Terreneums	Division	Capabilities
A.) Self		1.) sense
		2.) perception
		3.) emotion
B.) World	I. Intersubjectivity	1.) sense
		2.) perception
		3.) emotion
	II. Nature	1.) sense
		2.) perception
		3.) emotion
	III. Things	1.) sense
		2.) perception
		3.) emotion
	IV. History	1.) sense
		2.) perception
		3.) emotion
C.) God		1.) sense
		2.) perception
		3.) emotion

Source: Own editing

10.3 Examples and overlaps according to the logic table

There are different types of identity (cyber/virtual spatial, consumer, social, gender, familial, national, artistic, scientific, religious, political, etc.) which interact with each other. Since I consider the philosophically emphasized harmony as a balance to be important, one of the most attacked identity types, namely national identity, national consciousness, is defended from being rendered impossible or eliminated. What is national identity if not exclusion and hatred, as its opponents claim? Let us treat National Identity (NI) as a phenomenon that gives itself and needs to be expressed.

My philosophical methodology is as follows: I examine national identity - or national consciousness in its assumed state - as a phenomenon in terms of how, through what, in what ways it manifests itself, in terms of the the further development of Kantian transcendentalist ideas and concepts of reason.

4th Table: The concepts of mind, their division, and their relation to national identity

Terreneums	Division	Capabilities	Relation
A.) Self		1.) sense	identity
		2.) perception	tastes, smells
		3.) emotion	homeliness, love of country
B.) World	I. Intersubjectivity	1.) sense	language, literature, science, arts
		2.) perception	music, dance, films
		3.) emotion	sporting successes, sense of historical justice
	II. Nature	1.) sense	sustainability and responsibility
		2.) perception	hiking in the Carpathian Basin
		3.) emotion	symbolic landscapes
	III. Things	1.) sense	value-based relation
		2.) perception	tourism
		3.) emotion	imprintings/indentations in duration
	IV. History	1.) sense	members of a nation
		2.) perception	epochal symbols
		3.) emotion	respect for ancestors and tradition
C.) God		1.) sense	brothers and sisters in faith
		2.) perception	sacred symbols and holidays
		3.) emotion	religious community, civilization, ethics

Source: Own editing

A./1. The individual wants to define himself and considers national identity an integral part of his core of self.

A./2. The individual also expresses his national identity through his perception, i.e. he likes "home" tastes, smells, etc. (hungaricums).

A./3. The individual's national identity is emotionally committed to his or her sense of self, which is manifested in both a sense of being at home and a sense of love for his or her country.

B./I./1. In the world, through intersubjective - i.e. social - relationships, our sense of national identity is attuned to each other through shared understanding, such as a common language, complemented by the achievements of literary, artistic and scientific excellence (e.g. our sweet mother tongue, the Hymn, Munkácsy, Semmelweis).

B./I./2. Through intersubjective relationships in the world, our sense of national identity is intertwined through the music, dances and films that are known and enjoyed by everyone "at home". These are linked to perception, since their reception is primarily linked to perceptual perceptions, but they also have cultural significance, i.e. they are also embedded in sense and emotion (e.g. folk music, folk tales, film art).

B./I./3. Through intersubjective connections in the world, our sense of national identity is intertwined with our sense of joy - even fanatic pride - in national sporting successes, and our sense of historical truth (e.g. Olympic successes, historical essentialism).

B./II./1. A community with a national identity protects its own wildlife and nature, has a responsibility for sustainability for future generations (e.g. nature conservation, not wasting resources).

B./II./2. People with a national identity consider the Carpathian Basin to be of inescapable importance for hikes (e.g. Danube bend, Transylvania), although they also like to go on trips elsewhere.

B./II./3. People with a national identity feel closer to the symbolic landscapes of their "home" (e.g. Hortobágy, Lake Balaton).

B./III./1. People with a sense of national identity turn to - or turn away from - things on the basis of values (e.g. constitution, legal system).

B./III./2. Turning to things with a sense of national identity adds value to certain tourist destinations (e.g. Parliament, Eger Castle).

B./III./3. Some things of particular importance are imprinted in duration and occasionally their significance is highlighted in the community of people with a sense of national identity (e.g. flag, coat of arms).

B./IV./1. National identity in historical and conceptual terms is the history of brothers and sisters and of members and groups who have become brothers and sisters.

B./IV./2. National identity in historical and perceptual terms refers to the symbols of different periods and territories (e.g. national costumes, uniforms).

B./IV./3. National identity in a historical and perceptual context means respect for ancestors and tradition (e.g. St. Stephen's Day, freedom fighters, water sprinkling).

C./1. From God's point of view, representatives of national identity are understood as brothers and sisters in faith.

C./2. God is expressed through perception in sacred symbols and festivals (e.g. baptism, Easter, Christmas) for those who represent a national identity.

C./3. Nationally conscious believers are one in God. From God's point of view, the representatives of a national identity form an emotionally committed religious community, a civilisation, with internal ethical commandments (e.g. Christianity and culture).

Spatio-temporal location, circumstances and personality traits of psychological development, and changing community embeddedness determine who/what, when, which aspects are preferred and which are actually represented.

11. Conclusion

Critiquing dogmatic metaphysics - through the study of cognition - Kant posed antinomies - undecidable questions: 1) The antinomy of the temporal and spatial boundaries of the world (beginning vs. infinity), 2) The antinomy of the simple parts of the world (substance or totality of parts) 3.) the antinomy of the cause of all phenomena (laws of nature vs. freedom), 4) the antinomy of the cause of the world (the existence or non-existence of the absolute necessary being "God"). These are, according to him, counterpointed possibilities of argument, undecidable questions, especially because of the multiple applications of freedom-necessity and finite-finite. In a similar way, ontological indeterminacy applies to reason (Self, World, God), but they function as necessary, inescapable guiding reason for human beings, mainly for social, ethical, and moral reasons. Which question belongs to which mind?

Self - the immortality or mortality of the soul.
World - freedom versus necessity.[158]
God - existence versus non-existence.

These questions have been levelled from the point of view of modern science - they are illusions - and reflected upon as follows:

(1) First, our distinction with God was annihilated, that is, that the man created by God is the center, the point of orientation, the origin, everything for him of the created world. For science has replaced the Ptolemaic world view (man is the centre of the universe and the sun revolves around him) with the Copernican world view (the earth inhabited by man revolves around the sun).

2) Secondly, man is not the "apex" of the created environment, the ruler over all plants and animals, since according to Darwinian evolution the human species originated in the animal kingdom, evolving from the living world by phylogeny. Therefore, man is not originally separate and eternal in nature, but is itself the result/product of evolution.

3) Man is not even the master of his own "house", i.e. he is not the governing master of his own thoughts, will - not at all - of his consciousness, since his actions are guided by his unconsciousness, as Freudian psychoanalysis shows.

However, man needs to feel at home in order to feel self-sufficiently 'at home' in his own skin, in his community, in his environment, in his world, in eternity. What gives him this homeliness, and is it even necessary?

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[158] Hegel writes about Kant: "The general sense of Kantian philosophy is that definitions such as generality and necessity are not to be found in reality, as Hume has shown; they have therefore another source than perception, and this source is in the subject, in the self-consciousness of the self."(Kant, Kritik dér reinen Vernunft. 6th edition, Leipzig 1818. 3-5. 1.) This is the main thesis of Kantian philosophy. It is also called critical philosophy, because its aim is above all, says Kant, to be a critique of the cognitive faculty. Hegel 1977, p. 394.

According to Czétány a.) God corresponds to the disjunctive synthesis, which is the logic of conservatism, b.) the World corresponds to the connective synthesis and is the logic of globalism/communism, c.) the Self corresponds to the conjunctive synthesis and is the logic of liberalism.

I will now discuss this differently, which shows how fruitful the original Kantian theory can be in other contexts. The historical authoritarian feudal order and mutual homeliness-security triad was religion (God), the secular leader - e.g. king - (World), and the subject (Self), the latter of which was transformed into a citizen during the Enlightenment industrialization and the struggle for freedom, thus slowly transforming the other traditional authorities.

The bourgeoisie turned religion into ethics, moral education (see Reformation and institutionalized sed education), and a tolerant, in this sense liberal, legal system (social contract); and the kingdom into a liberal democracy. Thus was born the image of a nation-state/culture-state based on national foundations. In its external form, it no longer resembles the old religious and royal principle of authority, but its power pattern, its internal, unconsciously acting power structure still contains - albeit in an impersonal, anonymous way, as an empty master candidate (see Lacan's expression) - the principle of authority that Freud described as the need to conform to the symbolic ancestor (in psychoanalytic psychology as the 'superego') in the Book of Moses.[159]

Thus the liberal national form of government won by the bourgeoisie still carries with it, albeit in a trace and vestigial form, the old principle of authority, that is, the need for homeliness, that is, the need to submit to religious and secular leaders.

By submitting, Kant says, we remain minors and must establish our full autonomy, which, on further reflection, would mean for the citizenry a severing of all ties with religion and secular leaders, and thus of course the name "citizen" would no longer be "citizen". This is why we have heard the term 'petit bourgeois' used so pejoratively on so many occasions in the 20th century.

The missionary spirit of the extreme liberal and similar communist ideas considers the need for homeliness to be childish and wants to make humanity see that man is the only one who can count on himself, that there is no transcendence outside or within himself.

This is the obstacle to ultimate happiness, to Heaven on earth, according to the old-new mission of the total equality-redemption of all mankind. This, however, has proved to be a misunderstanding of Reality both in the days of the old Masonic lodges and today. In their attempts at historical realisation, unexpected events, from within or from the outside, have tipped the alliances for the salvation of mankind out of their own ruts. The complete homogenisation and uniformisation of humanity is a naive dream, for which they are able to deny/distort facts, values, and all criticism. Such is the mainstream European ideology of today.

It is expected that instead of different group values, the extreme liberal ideology will be institutionalised and universalised in all areas and at all levels, but this is precisely the technique

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[159] Freud, Sigmund: 1939/1987: *Mózes. Két tanulmány.* (trans. F. Ozorai Gizella), Európa, Budapest.

of what we call totalitarian system-building. However, according to them, the guilty party is the one who does not try to change the world. But what and for what are we losing with this?

What is being built up in rapid stages is a total surveillance system, a dictatorship of opinion, which uses algorithms to classify human behaviour according to all kinds of needs. We have become data sets, and everything is open to those who have this spy knowledge or who pay for this spying; not least spying is severely condemned by Kant[160]. We have lost our religious roots, and our respect for authority, and we can no longer imagine our place in the world (the famous saying of the Delphic oracle: *Gnóthi seauton* - Know thyself! – i. e. Your destination in the cosmos). We have become „anybodies". Citizens of the world.

But the need to feel at home is always there, because we are exposed to unexpected events and in the postmodern age - when advertising promises that we can be anyone - we are anxious about our outsiders, because others can hold us accountable for our outsidership - for example, for our childhood statements, our daydreams. We can be anyone we want, but in this way, in this form, it's too much. This leads to resignation, to becoming nobody, anonymous anybodies, posers, whatever. This is hypocrisy and being without true stakes.

What can a re-established sense of national identity bring back in the 21st century? Not a nostalgia for the past, but a moral education/attitude and faith to meet contemporary challenges, from which we can draw strength, brothers and sisters of the nation, a solidarity network of institutions, and self-worth.

Religiousness provides moral education and cultural and civilisational identity for our children. The community of brothers and sisters of a nation can be extended to larger, international political/economic/cultural groups, but can also be concentrated locally in many ways - these interact with each other. A sense of national identity in the 21st century gives individuals self-esteem and social integrity. A sense of national identity in the 21st century can therefore bring together the trinity of God-World-Self, providing harmony and a livable sense of home. The logic of its philosophical background is summarised in a table.

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[160] Kant, Immanuel (1795/1985): *Az örök békéhez.* (ford. Babits Mihály), Európa, Budapest. (Mérleg), I. szakasz, 6. cikkben: „[…] a kémek alkalmazása - *uti exploratoribus* -, ami tulajdonképpen csak kihasználása a *mások* becstelenségének: ezt pedig bizony sohasem lehet kiirtani."
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